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Abstract

ISRAELI, PALESTINIAN AND EGYPTIAN EXPLANATIONS OF
POLITICAL ACTIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

by
Bethamie Horowitz

Adviser: Professor Stephen P. Cohen

This study investigated how people affiliated with
different parties in an international conflict understand
their own actions and the actions of their adversaries.
Using data gathered in the Middle East in 1982, the study
examined the explanations offered by 1336 Israeli Jews,
Palestinians (living in Israel) and Egyptians to three
political events in the Middle East:
conducts a raid on Beirut,'

'Israeli Air Force

'Palestinians attack a bus on

the Haifa - Tel Aviv highway,' and 'A peace treaty is
announced between Israel and Egypt'.
The study, an exploratory analysis, was carried out in
a sequence of stages.

First, the analysis involved a

V

comparison of the substantive interpretations of the 'same'
events by people from three Middle Eastern societies.
Second, a typology of responses to the three political
events was developed which identified different cognitive
orientations toward the conflict environment.

Third,

distinctive patterns of response across the three political
events were identified using latent class analysis
(Lazarsfeld, 1954, 1959; Goodman, 1974).
It was expected that parties to a conflict would
explain the 'same' events differently.

The extent of these

differences, however, varied not only by nationality, but
with each type of event.

War events were seen as more

familiar and predictable in their causes and consequences
than peace events.

Thus, the study revealed parallel ways

of thinking about war events across societies.

In contrast,

a peace action generated differences in interpretation among
all three of the national groups.

At the cognitive level

the peace action appeared to unsettle the stereotypic
expectations that each party has of the others, implying
that rather than trying to change perceptions by addressing
them directly via cognitive techniques, more types of events
are needed which can shake up the closed perceptual system
created by ongoing hostile events.
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Introduction

Attribution theory, a topic which has dominated social
psychology for the past two decades, can be understood as an
attempt to consider "the ways in which people represent to
themselves their understanding of the social world in which
they live" (Tajfel and Fraser, 1978, p. 231).

Despite this

broad scope, much of the research has been more narrowly
focused on how individuals perceive or infer the causes of
interpersonal events, and has not considered actions
involving ethnic or cultural groups or nations.

This study

explores people's understanding of events occurring in the
context of international conflict.

More specifically, this

study investigates how people affiliated with different
parties in a conflict understand their own actions and the
actions of their adversaries.
Attribution theory attempts to explore the differences
in definition of the situation as experienced by actors and
observers of a particular action.

The actor tends to

explain his/her own behavior in terms of cues in the
environment, whereas an observer tends to give more weight
to the actor's role in the scene.

The point is that actor

and observer present divergent accounts of the supposedly
same event (Jones and Nisbett, 1971).

Although the

phenomenon was originally termed 'the fundamental
attribution error'

(Ross, 1977), for the present purposes

its significance lies not in the guestion of accuracy of
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perception implied by the term 'error,1 but in the fact that
observers and actors seem to attend to such different
aspects of the total field.

The researcher can be viewed as

scrutinizing both accounts, attempting to explain how both
explanations can arise out of the supposedly 'same' scene.
The general trend among attribution theorists has been
to reformulate the goal of the researcher:

"...the task of

attribution theory is not to explain why our explanations
conflict - because they don't - much less to explain our
errors; it is to explain why, from our different
perspectives, we tend to emphasize different parts of the
same total explanation" (Locke and Pennington, 1982, p.
218).

Yet, as Billig (1982) specifically notes, "there are

times when different explanations most certainly do
conflict..." (p. 186), for instance, as in wartime.

The

present investigation offers a case in point: a study of how
Palestinians, Israelis, and Egyptians interpret events
occurring in the course of the Middle East conflict, such as
air raids, terrorist attacks and peace treaties.
In epistemological terms conflict can be said to
involve a conflict over the definition of the situation.
Billig, not writing about attribution theory, notes that
certain research traditions have had little to do with the
"problems related to enemies who are not members of a
coherent higher group and who are struggling violently to
impose their contrasting world-views upon each other"
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(Billig, 1977, p. 421).

The same could be said of

attribution literature as it stands.

Formulated in this

way, the problem touches on an underlying issue in social
theory —

the extent to which theory deals with conflict and

consensus in social life.

On the one hand, Roger Brown has

noted regarding causal attribution that where there is
social consensus, there is no need for explanation: "So long
as we agree about the causes of social action we do not
notice that causes have to be worked out by a process of
induction." (Brown, 1986, p. 131).

Yet when explanations

conflict, many attribution researchers attempt to determine
error or bias in order to reconcile the accounts, as if to
say that there must be a unitary (and 'correct')
explanation, rather than attending to the meaning of the
existence of divergent accounts.

There seems to be an

assumption (or expectation) of consensus underlying all of
this.1
To speak of 'bias' in an international conflict misses
the point that actions may have different meanings to
different parties in a conflict.2

Thus, an event like

^■Billig (1982) makes this point about much theory in
social psychology.
2Kruglanski and Ajzen (1983) have argued that
attribution theorists should adopt the more subjective
notion of 'bias' in place of 'error', pointing out that "all
knowledge is subject to bias, but not all knowledge need be
experienced as erroneous".
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Sadat's 1977 visit to Jerusalem was not In Itself a single
thing to be perceived or misperceived: it meant different
things to different people, depending on where they stood in
the conflict (Azar and Cohen, 1979).

And it continues to be

interpreted and reinterpreted in light of more recent events
and developments.

At the same time, there may have been a

basic consensus at a 'pre-perceptual' level of how people
viewed Sadat's visit to Jerusalem:

that it was something

momentous which boded change in the status quo.

But there

was no agreement on whether it was good or bad, on why it
was happening, or on what the consequences would be.
the 'whatness' of the event was problematic —

Even

what the

Egyptians called "Sadat's visit to Jerusalem" Israelis
termed "Sadat's visit to Israel".

The difference in meaning

is significant, implying for Egyptians on the one hand that
Sadat visited Jerusalem (and not Israel), and suggesting for
Israelis on the other hand that an Arab leader had finally
come to Israel.
Similarly, the 1982 war in Lebanon takes on very
different meanings if it is termed "Israeli invasion of
Lebanon," "Sharon's invasion,"

"Operation Peace in the

Galilee," or "the Israeli-Palestinian War."

Partly the

words involve propaganda, the conscious use of language to
manipulate images.

But partly these reflect and perpetuate

basic perceptual differences.
Regarding a conflict, the relevant question for the
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social psychological investigator is not 'what are the true
(unbiased) facts?,' rather,
as the relevant facts?'.

'what does the interpreter see

This reformulation is an important

one because it redirects any argument over 'the facts' to
the clash in world views or "reality worlds" (Cantril, 1958)
of the arguers.

A more encompassing view of the situation

would be one which included the competing views of the
conflict, rather than one which depended on an agreed-upon
set of 'facts'.

Rendering the issue this way the researcher

can seek to identify and compare the "preferred modes of
reasoning" (Harre, 1981) or the preferred modes of
perceiving of different parties within a conflict setting.3
In the present study some of these relationships are
examined systematically, using data gathered in the Middle
East in 1982 as part of the "Images in Conflict" project.4
The study explores how Israelis, Egyptians and Palestinians
view certain types of political events that have occurred in
the Middle East conflict:

'Israeli Air Force conducts a

raid on Beirut,' 'Palestinians attack a bus on the Haifa -

3In a parallel vein Eiser (1983) points out that the
very selection of a particular script by which to make sense
of incoming experience is an event in itself, from which
particular consequences follow.
4"Images in Conflict" was a cross-cultural study about
the Arab-Israeli conflict which was conducted in the Middle
East and the United States. It is described in detail in the
'method section' of this paper.
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Tel Aviv highway,' and 'A peace treaty is announced between
Israel and Egypt'.

In addition to these questions, the

respondents were interviewed about their perceptions,
expectations and desires about conflict and peace, so that
it is possible to relate people's explanations of political
events to a larger body of images, beliefs and feelings
about their experience in the Middle East.
The availability of these data presents an opportunity
to consider a wider range of questions about peoples' social
perceptions than is usually possible in attributional
studies5 .

In particular, three areas of inquiry are of

interest.

The first involves the comparison of the

substantive interpretations of the 'same' events by people
from three Middle Eastern societies.

Are there 'preferred

modes of perceiving' within each national group?

The second

focus of the research is to explore how people within three
societies involved in a conflict make sense of new
developments in the political environment.

Oo underlying

outlooks change to accommodate new types of events, or are
'new' events assimilated into existing interpretive
frameworks?

Finally, the overall purpose of this research

5Kelley and Michela (1980) identify a gap in
attributional research: "If attribution theory requires, by
its very nature, a detailed analysis of the common person's
causal categories, it also requires understanding of the
natural context in which the process occurs." (pp. 490-491)
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is to explore the implications of these questions for
conflict resolution.

The examination of these substantive

issues, using empirical data gathered in a large-scale study
in the Middle East, offers systematic consideration of
problems central to peacemaking in the Middle East.

A Conflict Resolution Perspective
So far the rationale for this study has been
expressed by proposing that the consideration of the case of
international conflict can expand social psychologists'
understanding of the dynamics of causal attribution, by
providing a 'hot' context within which to consider the
competing causal analyses offered by the various parties
involved in a conflict.

The present study also emerges out

of an interest in peacemaking, however.

From this

perspective, attributional analysis might be seen as a
useful tool or starting point for researchers interested in
conflict and conflict resolution, since it can help to
sharpen each party's awareness of the existence of diverse
accounts for the 'same' event.
The dissertation falls within a tradition in the field
of conflict resolution that is distinctly sociopsychological (Kelman, Cohen, 1979; Deutsch, 1973; Lewin,
1948; Simmel, 1955; Sherif, 1967; Rapoport, 1960, 1974;
Swingle, 1970).

This perspective starts from the assumption

that the parties' apparent resistance or inability to
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'reason peacefully' Is a result of the dynamics and context
of conflict, rather than due to Inherent evil or stupidity
of the parties themselves.

This approach to conflict

resolution has neither focused on the history and origins of
the conflict, nor attempted to identify a specific
substantive solution.

Rather, it has addressed the kinds

of processes which escalate conflict and those which lead
towards conflict resolution.
Research from within this perspective has contributed
certain ideas to the analysis of conflict.

For example, the

asymmetry of knowledge for parties within the conflict
system (knowing more about one's own side than about the
other side) has been identified as a basic characteristic of
conflict (Azar and Cohen, 1979).

Compounded with the

virtual lack of interaction between the societies in an
ongoing conflict, such asymmetry leads to a predom'.nance of
strategic thinking, wherein any information received about
the enemy is interpreted in terms of its presumed
destructive intent.

For would-be conflict resolvers the

challenge becomes one of finding ways for the parties to
communicate accurately and credibly to each other in the
face of these strong countervailing tendencies.

Ultimately

this approach to conflict resolution suggests that the
problem of peacemaking involves not only changing each
party's actual intentions (desires) regarding peaceful
relations, but also increasing the capacity of each side to
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believe that the other side has changed.
The Problem-solving Workshop
One research setting which has proved fruitful for
identifying the requirements for credible communication has
been the problem-solving workshop (Kelman, Cohen, 1979;
Cohen, Kelman, Miller & Smith, 1977; also Doob, 1970, Doob
and Foltz, 1973 and Burton, 1969 for related approaches).
Within this mini-environment of four participants from each
side (e.g. Israelis and Palestinians) and a third party of
social scientists there is an opportunity to explore a
powerful phenomenon in international conflict: the strong
differences between the different societies' social
constructions of reality, and the major behavioral
consequences that follow from those formulations.
In the course of the problem-solving workshop it
becomes quickly apparent that despite even the most genuine
desire to communicate openly with the other side, the
participants lack a common set of concepts for discussing
the volatile issues between them.
racism, national identity —

Zionism, PLO, terrorism,

these terms have different

meanings within each national group.

A joke which seems

funny to one group is insulting to another; a unifying
symbol proposed by one group in the cooperative spirit of
the workshop cannot really be embraced by the other because
it is seen as ultimately coopting (for detailed examples see
Cohen, et al., 1977).

These moments of divergent reactions
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to the same stimulus could be considered 'events' within the
workshop.

Probing these differences in meaning can provide

experiential rather than simply intellectual learning for
the participants about the deeper feelings, values and needs
underlying the political issues, and offers the participants
a chance to begin to reassess their basic assumptions about
the nature and goals of the other side, as well as their own
group's identity and purposes.
Above all, the problem-solving workshop is a rich
micro-setting for exploring communication in conflict; it is
a source of hypotheses, although not the place to test
hypotheses systematically on a broader scale.6

One of its

analytic contributions has been to identify (and even
engineer) the types of experiences between the adversaries

6Some have situated the importance of the sociopsychological approach in the "pre-negotiation" stage of
resolving the conflict — that is, in getting the parties to
even agree to sit together at the negotiating table —
rather than as a substitute for negotiation over the basic
issues involved in the conflict.
A protracted conflict,
such as the one in the Middle East, calls for a different
conflict resolution strategy than 'simple' interstate
disputes, since much more is included in the conflict than
different positions and material considerations.
In this
case, mediation alone is not sufficient:
"Mediation was not successful in modifying basic Arab
or Israeli attitudes, nor has it resolved the Arab-Israeli
conflict. The root causes of the conflict are too complex
and too deeply embedded in national ideologies. Such
conflicts can be resolved only as a result of
transformations in national values and ideologies,
transformations that may come about as a result of gradual
evolution, rather than skillful mediation." (Touval, 1982 p.
331).
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that can break through the routinlzed or hardened ways of
thinking that have evolved in each society.

In particular,

the experiences in the problem-solving workshop provide
powerful anecdotal evidence of the importance of examining
differences within and between societies in the meaning and
understanding of significant events.

Each workshop offers

such examples, but not in ways which have been verified
empirically beyond the small group.

The present study will

explore these differences systematically on a larger scale,
although without the component of direct interaction between
people from different sides, in order to identify patterns
and regularities in the understanding of broader segments in
each society.
Events Data Analysis
Where the problem-solving workshop might be
characterized as excelling at the interpretative level (i.e.
the exploration of the meaning and significance of the
issues in conflict for the different parties), the "events
data" approach to international conflict and cooperation
developed by international relations scholars (Azar, 1980;
Azar and Ben Dak, 1975; Azar, McLaurin, Havener, Murphy
Sloan & Wagner, 1977) has emphasized the examination of
regularities at the behavioral level.

While the workshop

approach shines in providing rich evidence, it falls chort
when it comes to empirical verification, whereas the events
data approach has the advantage of being empirically

12

verifiable, although it has the disadvantage of assuming an
'objective' basis for deciding the meaning of an event.
Events data research emerges out of a concern for
developing an empirical basis for studying the patterns of
international conflict and cooperation.

In this approach,

events have been treated as data about the flow of
international interactions, rather than as stimuli for
examining differing constructions of reality (i.e. the flow
of consciousness) as in the problem-solving workshop.

These

scholars have analyzed trends in conflict and peace by
recording the numerous 'transactions' which occur between
nations day by day —

such as trade accords, ambassador

exchanges, border skirmishes, attacks, treaties and summit
talks —

as reported in various newspapers.

The analyst

codes each event according to a standardized scale which
assesses the cooperative or conflictive nature of the
activity.

These collections of events provide the data for

exploring behavioral patterns of relations between nations
over different time periods. This approach attempts to
consider the system-level of international relations, rather
than the view of any particular nation.
Difficulties arise at the operational level, in that
the evaluation is based on the sender's intent only, and
does not

consider the receiver's perception of the sender's

intent (Burgess and Lawton, 1975).

For instance, Sadat's

visit to Jerusalem might be coded as highly cooperative from
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the viewpoint of Egypt, but it might be seen as a more
hostile or suspect action from the viewpoint of another
actor in the interaction system.

The problem here is that

the database, by excluding the various interpretations of
the receivers and observers of a particular international
act, and by emphasizing the view of one actor over the other
participants in the system, does not in fact capture the
system-level of behavior.

Thus, this approach does not

permit the researcher to consider the selection process
involved in international behavior —

what is perceived or

not perceived, what is communicated versus what is received.
The events data approach has contributed some important
concepts to the study of conflict and cooperation.

Most

relevant for the present purposes is the notion of a 'normal
relations range* between nations (Azar, Jureidini and
McLauren, 1978).

This concept refers to the stabilization

of relations among actors in a system, when a relationship
comes to be characterized by a limited range of behavior, or
pattern of interaction, beyond which acts tend to be
unlikely or improbable at both conflictive and cooperative
extremes.

These equilibrium ranges, "whether mainly

conflictive, mainly cooperative, or somewhere in between,
tend to be wide enough to accommodate the perceptions of the
parties as to what is predictable in light of the behavioral
experience and structural conditions; they can also shift
depending on various situations and constraints" (Azar and
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Cohen, 1979, p. 164).

When actions take place which push

the boundaries of the range, either they are experienced as
crises, or they are perceived in terms consistent with the
status quo, the equilibrium range (e.g. a 'peaceful' act is
understood as in fact being a ploy, or as a conflictescalating action).

Thus in the case of a protracted

conflict it is possible to think of 'peace as crisis and war
as status quo'

(Azar and Cohen, 1979).

This conceptualization is important for the present
study because it emphasizes the context formed by past
actions, a context within which subsequent occurrences take
place.

Thus it allows us to pose a socio-psychological

question about how people and societies deal with unexpected
events and subsequent changes in their environment.
These two research efforts —

the problem-solving

workshop and the events data approach —

emphasize different

aspects of international conflict: the problem solving
workshop is more depth-oriented in tracing the meanings and
understanding which develop within each society about the
relations between them, whereas the events data approach
emphasizes the ongoing patterns of relations between the
interacting nations.

Each approach acts as a corrective to

the other: the workshop provides insight about some of the
internal thinking and feeling within each society which the
events data approach ignores, whereas the events data
approach tracks the changing historical environment of
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interrelations among nations.

The present study seeks to

link these two approaches by considering on the one hand how
different types of actions are digested within each of the
societies in conflict, and on the other hand, in what way
changes in the inter-nation environment affect the mental
frameworks used to make sense of political actions.

The Explanation of International Actions
In theoretical terms the study develops a typology of
explanation of international actions.

Proposing such a

theory requires drawing on work from three areas in social
psychology:

the analysis of causal attribution, conflict

resolution, and cognitive social psychology.

Attribution

theory will be considered first, and later the insights
gleaned from conflict resolution and from cognitive social
psychology will be incorporated.

In shifting from

attributions within the interpersonal world to explanations
of events between nations, the traditional attributional
framework needs to be modified to account for differences in
both the structure of the event to be described (the
attribution 'scenario') and the functions of explanation in
the conflict setting.

Attribution researchers have

traditionally examined only the attributional processes of
individuals about other individuals, without considering the
larger social and contextual factors that structure the
social world within which the individual operates.
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Certainly in the case of attributions within the conflict
environment, the perceptual and evaluative dimensions used
to explain events result from the conflict itself, and are
not located solely within the individual.

Thus an overall

adjustment needed for such a theory of explanation of
political events involves shifting attributional analysis
from an inter-individual (often merely dyadic) orientation
to a more genuinely socio-psychological stance.
Attributional Analysis and the Conflict Environment
At its core, attribution theory is a theory about
salience: it involves the notion that a particular aspect of
a total scene may be so salient to the interpreter that it
floods his/her view of what happened (Heider, 1958).

For

the observer the mere activity of the actor within the scene
captures the attention, whereas the actor 'looks out on' the
environment, so that the salience depends on the perceptual
vantage point of the interpreter.

The importance of this

perceptual orientation within traditional attribution
research is further heightened by considering work of Storms
(1973) which demonstrates how easily the observer's causal
attributions can be altered by simply shifting the
observer's visual focus from taking in the overall scene to
attending specifically to the actor.

This has also been

explained in terms of getting the observer to empathize with
or take the role of the actor (Regan and Totten, 1975).
researcher can shift the observer's cognitive perspective

The
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simply by redirecting the observer's perceptual attention
(see also Taylor and Fiske, 1978, and Brown, 1986).
The conflict environment changes the nature of the
salience from largely perceptual to overwhelmingly
evaluative.

It presents a context in which the formal,

positional differences in the perspectives of the parties
are further transformed by the evaluative aspects of
adversarial relations: "the enemy is evil, but we are
moral".

Thus, as Hewstone and Jaspars (1982) have written

about intergroup attribution, "...behavior does not always
engulf the field.

Rather, the strength and content of the

prior beliefs about the other group may be dominant.
Indeed, if we take these beliefs to be part of the Gestalt
'field', we might say that 'the field engulfs the
behavior'." (p. 111).
Although attribution theory appears to be relevant to
the analysis of conflict because it is a theory which takes
into account the different perspectives of two parties
located in different parts of the physical space, it also
presents some serious shortcomings when applied to the
situation of international conflict.
by its spatial orientation.

First, it is limited

In the traditional

attributional paradigm the actor and observer coexist in
their neutral noninteraction; neither one cares particularly
about the other's explanation (In fact, they don't have any
relationship whatsoever!), whereas in a real conflict
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situation the difficult relationship between the two parties
itself lies at the core of the conflict, and their divergent
positions are not able to calmly coexist.
The conflict environment places a unique limitation on
the attributional problem.

The built-in tension between the

parties in a conflict yields a situation in which there are
either adversaries or allies but rarely neutral parties.
Here there is no easy manipulation of perspectives to get
the parties to look at things differently; such a technique
tends to be perceived by parties in serious conflicts as
disingenuous, a superficial attempt by third parties to
smooth over deeply felt problems (Cohen, et al., 1977).7
In this light the traditional attributional paradigm
can be seen as a 'minimally constrained' scenario, since it

7This distinction is further amplified by noting that
traditional attribution theory has been built on the idea of
two individuals, whereas in conflicts between groups many
more elements are involved: not only one person's view of
another, but also the relations between the groups, and
between individuals and their groups, as well as the
collective and individual images and ideologies, memories
and expectations of the conflict (Horwitz and Berkowitz,
1975; Moscovici, 1981; Rapoport, 1974). Moreover, the
implications for conflict resolution differ significantly in
the case of two individuals versus two collectivities. One
way to resolve a conflict between two individuals is to
simply separate them, as in a divorce or in an
organizational setting (Walton, 1969). But when the parties
are groups of people, whole social structures and ideologies
are involved, and the conflict is no longer 'resolvable' via
physical separation, because whether or not the parties wish
it, they will continue to interact within the social (or
regional) system. In other words, interaction between the
parties cannot be reduced to zero.
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is evaluatively neutral.

It is surprising that the views

of actor and observer diverge at all.

In contrast the

conflict environment is nearly over-determined (maximal),
and the expectation is that accounts given for the 'same'
event will be radically different.8
Thus, in terms of the scenario itself, several
considerations distinguish the events used in the present
study from the types of events used in traditional
attribution studies.

First, both actors and observers in

the present study are affiliated with various parties in the
conflict: the actors in the three events to be examined are
'the Israeli Air Force',

'Palestinians', and 'Israel and

Egypt', and the observers/interpreters (respondents) are
individual Israelis, Egyptians, and Palestinians.

This

element of identity implies that there is more at stake than
simply being an outside, unaffiliated observer of an action
(Rosenberg and Wolfsfeld, 1977; Tajfel and Turner, 1979;
Wilder, 1986), in that persons interpreting an event which
involves their own group will be keenly aware of the
implications for their own group of the action in the

8This contrast has implications at the practical level:
in traditional attribution studies the researcher must
describe a scene or create a plausible vignette (in writing,
or shown as a film, e.g.) for the subject to interpret. In
the present study, simply mentioning the 'headline' of the
event was sufficient to evoke recognition by the respondents
of occurrences that were very plausible or salient within
the conflict environment.
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scenario.

Moreover, the events described in the present

study include a 'target' or recipient of an action in
addition to the actor, a feature which connects the
interpreter even more to different scenarios by virtue of
identification with either the actor or the
target/recipient/victim of the action.9

In this regard it

will be important to consider the extent of the
interpreter's affiliation or identification with the group,
since this may vary across individuals.
Second, whereas the standard scenario in traditional
attribution studies involves an individual actor and an
individual observer, the scenarios in the present study
concern a different type of actor altogether: the actors are
corporate entities —

'the airforce',

'Palestinians', and

'Israel and Egypt', while the observers are individuals.
The explanations that individuals give about group/corporate
behavior may differ in significant ways from individuals
explaining other individuals' behavior, particularly when
these corporate actors are nations.
Finally, the actions being performed in these scenarios
take place within an overall climate of conflict and peace:

9Farr and Anderson (1983) have noted that Jones and
Nisbett's 'actor-observer' terminology loses the relational
aspect of 'person-other' in Heider's original work: self in
relation to other. "The distinction [is] a possible basis
for differing states of awareness which might alternate
within one person." (p 63)
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'bombing Beirut',
treaty*.

'attacking a bus in Israel',

'a peace

In this regard individuals' interpretations of any

event must be considered in relation to their broader ideas,
beliefs, feelings, desires and expectations about this
environment, since it is within this context that the
particular event takes on meaning.
Explanatory Categories for Understanding Events
Given these differences between the situations covered
by the traditional attributional framework and the conflict
environment, the value of using the situationaldispositional (external-internal) distinction as a relevant
dimension in analyzing people's understanding of
international conflict can be evaluated in terms of the
contributions and limitations of the attributional
framework.

There have been at least two attributional

studies related to the Arab-Israeli conflict (Heradstveit,
1979, Rosenberg and Wolfsfeld, 1975), which found that one
side's own 'good' act and the enemy's 'bad' act are seen as
arising out of the acting party's disposition, whereas one
side's own 'bad* act and the enemy's 'good' act are seen as
due to the situation.

Thus people's interpretations of

actions reveal themselves as moral, good, justified, and the
enemy as evil, unjustified.

'When we do a bad act we were

forced by circumstance, whereas they did it by design.'
Underlying the use of situational/dispositional distinction
in the case of conflict is the assignment of credit or
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blame, which is ultimately an evaluative process.10 The
value of this type of analysis is that it sharply displays
the parallel structure of each side's perception of the
conflict.

But once it is known that these cognitive

tendencies exist, and that the conflict setting only
heightens the distinctions between the parties and thrusts
the explanations of action into a moral evaluative
framework, it is worthwhile to examine these evaluative
factors more directly and specifically.11
Another reason to move beyond the situationaldispositional distinction in the case of international
conflict is that the distinction itself may not be among the
natural categories that people use in understanding actions
even in their inter-individual environment (Antaki, 1982;
Eiser, 1983) .

It is important to consider what other

dimensions emerge in the eyes of the beholders, rather than
limit the explanations in advance to a situationaldispositional formulation.

Leddo, Abelson and Gross (1984)

suggest that the script or knowledge-structure approach

10In a sense this view of the conflict setting
resembles the 'new look' work in perception, in that
motivation — prior beliefs, values and needs — is seen as
exerting a powerful effect on perception and cognition.
Kelley (1973) raises this question about the effects of
motivation and prior beliefs for attribution theorists.
^ B illig (1985) raises a similar point: "prejudice [is]
more than perception." (p. 85)

23

would be more fruitful (see also Eiser, 1983).

Buss (1978)

suggests that 'reasons' will be offered by actors, whereas
'causes' will be given by observers, when they are asked to
explain what brought about an event.
Finally, Kruglanski and Ajzen (1983) write that
"person-environment (internal-external) categories do not
esem basic to the process of attribution; instead they
appear restricted to cases in which the information
contained in these particular categories may in some way
further the individual's objectives" (p. 26).

Instead, they

argue, the goals or interests of the person, as well as
momentary salience or mental availability of particular
constructs, have more to do with the eventual attributions
or explanations that people make.

It is possible to

extrapolate from these comments to the interpretations made
at the group, collective level.
The Social Dimension
The present study considers how people make sense of
the changing stream of events involving their society and
other societies in a conflict.

A missing element so far in

the analysis offered by attribution theory is the social
nature of the attributional process, and the important
effects of the societal context on the explanatory
processes.
In a situation of protracted conflict in particular,
the societal context plays a central role in shaping
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people's understanding of political events which have
meaning at the group level, in that individuals' responses
are mediated via various channels of social communication
which have already filtered the ways of seeing the events —
the views of the media, statements of leaders, rumors, etc..
Hewstone and Jaspars (1984) identify the social nature of
attributions on three levels.

First, the events (objects of

attribution) themselves involve societies, not simply
individuals; second, the 'digestion' process involves more
than individual perceivers, in that people develop their
understanding of the events via their membership in larger
groups (or subgroups within societies); and third,
individuals can draw on the shared (social) beliefs, images,
representations as a source of schemata about social events.
Thus, recent research in causal attribution has
expanded the focus from the processes of individual
perceivers to include the social-contextual aspects of those
processes (Hewstone and Jaspars, 1982; Deschamps, 1983;
Eiser, 1983; Taylor and Jaggi, 1974; Doise, 1978; Tajfel,
1981; Moscovici, 1981).

One line of research in intergroup

perception and attribution has considered how people
perceive the actions of other individuals who belong to
different social groups.

For instance, Duncan (1976)

studied the 'perceptual readiness' of white observers to
label the behavior performed by black actors as more violent
than the same behavior performed by whites.

Rather than
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merely identifying prejudiced individuals as though they
existed outside of a particular societal context, Duncan
suggests that it makes more sense to consider the social
environment that underlies this labelling tendency.

In a

much earlier study Pettigrew (1958) found that the C-scale
(conformity) was as good a predictor of racial attitudes
among South African whites and among whites in the South
U.S. as the F-scale (authoritarianism).

He concluded that

socio-cultural factors play an important role in heightening
racial prejudice (in addition to personality factors),
particularly in areas where there has been a history of
racial intolerance.

These studies demonstrate the

importance of considering the socio-historical context in
making sense of individual processer 12

12Thus, in certain research problems the apparent
disposition is due to the situation. Consider, for
instance, Milgram's study of obedierce to authority
(Milgram, 1974). Prior to the study psychiatrists and other
predicted that only 'beasts' would actually obey the
experimenter's command to shock the learner ( a
dispositional prediction). Contrary to their expectations a
significant number of subjects actually did obey. However
the compliance rate changed substantially over the course of
the study's situational variations of the experimental
condition, and the F-scale was not a predictor of tendency
to comply. Thus what appeared to be a beastly disposition
was due to the situation (and the fundamental attribution
error was committed by the outside observersl). Unlike the
Authoritarian Personality, which was designed to explore
prejudiced personalities, the obedience study was designed
to permit researchers to understand the strength of
situational factors.
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Another line of research has emphasized the importance
of images at the broader social level for understanding both
the content of individual-level perceptions and the nature
of the evolving relations between groups.

Moscovici (1981)

describes the importance of social representations —
images, beliefs, myths, stereotypes —

the

that develop in a

society about various domains in human experience, over and
above the particular attitudes of any individuals.

These

representations serve to make the unfamiliar familiar and
the unexpected or unusual predictable.

Social

representations link the individual and social levels
together, providing building blocks or mental categories at
the social level for individuals to draw upon, as if from an
existing and constantly evolving store of images, ideas and
'arguments' (Billig, 1985).
If the social aspect of commonplaces or representations
is stressed, then the implication is that contrary
elements are liable to be widely disseminated in a
given society. Apart from a minority of professional
ideologues... the majority will possess both pro and con
elements... (p. 98)
In these formulations, processes which exist independently
of the psychological processes of individuals operate at the
social level, much as lanoue lies over and above parole
(Saussure) or Durkheim's "social facts" differ from
individual behavior.
Similarly, Tajfel (1981) has considered the role of
social stereotypes in intergroup relations, rather than
concentrating only on the functions of stereotypes for the
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individual.

He has suggested three main functions that

social stereotypes might serve: 1) explanations of social
causality —

explaining why an event occurs; 2)

justification of actions by one group towards another group;
and 3) differentiation of identity between groups.

It makes

sense to examine and categorize people's explanations of
various events in the Middle East conflict in terms of their
apparent functions at the group/social level as Tajfel
describes.
On this point Doise (1978), Kelley (1983) and Hewstone
and Jaspars (1982) have commented on the important causal
role that intergroup attributions play in intergroup
relations.

The way people explain the actions of the other

side can change how the relations between groups unfold.
The implication is that it should be possible to spell out
different types of intergroup reasoning and to delineate the
implications of different types of explanation for the
unfolding relations between the groups.
These last points bring us to a final concern in the
present study, a concern which the attributional framework
leaves unexplored and unanswered: how people's mental
categories or causal schemata change over time and
circumstances.

A theory of explanation of international

actions must take a fluid, dynamic approach in order to
consider the evolution of mental categories or frameworks
that people use to interpret the sequence of happenings in
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their environment and the way that each new event
potentially modifies the mental frameworks.

For certain

events there are readily accessible categories (Bruner,
1957); for other events, new categories emerge or are
readjusted.
Neisser (1976) has written about individual
perception:
...perception is directed by expectations but not
controlled by them; it involves the pickup of real
information. Schemata exert their effects by selecting
some kinds of information rather than others, not by
manufacturing false percepts or illusions. The old
joke that the optimist sees the doughnut while the
pessimist sees the hole does not imply that either is
mistaken.
It does suggest, however, that each of them
will be confirmed in his mood by what he has seen. If
the environment is rich enough to support more than one
alternative view (and it usually is), expectations can
have cumulative effects on what is perceived that are
virtually irreversible until the environment itself
changes. But environments do change, and thus loosen
the grip of the old ways of seeing. The interplay
between schema and situation means that neither
determines the course of perception alone, (p 43-44)
Of course, Neisser is writing about the perception of
generalized individuals within a vaguely defined, general
environment, rather than about group or societal
expectations in and of a conflict.

In the situation of

international conflict people may have come to expect more
hostilities,

yet they do not simply fit all that they

encounter into preset categories.

At times, new events

(like a Sadat's visit to Jerusalem) require a change in the
mental categories which would not otherwise be able to
assimilate them.

Then the mental structures must shift to
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accommodate the new information.
The present study does not permit the examination of
changes in people attributions or explanations over
different time periods, since there are data available from
one study only.

However, the study examines the

explanations given for different types of events.

Certain

types of events (typical, hostile ones, like attacks or
raids) are likely to be assimilated into existing mental
structures, and other events (atypical, or peaceful,
cooperative ones) to require more accommodation of peoples'
mental frameworks.

The Method

The study reported here uses data gathered in 1982 in
the "Images in Conflict" project,1 a unique cross-cultural
social scientific inquiry about the Arab-Israel conflict
which was designed and implemented by scholars from four
national groups (American, Egyptian, Palestinian and
Israeli).

Since the data examined in the present analysis

were gathered as part of the "Images in Conflict" project,
it is necessary to outline the overall method and design of
the Images study before focusing specifically on the
questions about political events.
The goal of the "Images in Conflict" project was "to
analyze, understand and overcome barriers to equal status
and peaceful relations among the peoples in the conflict:

1
The study was supported primarily by the United States
Agency for International Development, with additional
assistance from The Ford Foundation.
Dr. Stephen P. Cohen was the Principal Investigator and
Dr. Harriet C. Arnone was the Project Coordinator. The
Project Directors were: Dr. A. M. Al-Mashat (Cairo
University, Egypt), Dr. Edward. E. Azar (Center for
International Development, University of Maryland, USA), Dr.
Kadry Hefni (Ain Shams University, Egypt), Dr. Michael Inbar
(Hebrew University, Israel), Dr. Sharif Kanaana (Najjah
University, Nablus, West Bank), Mr. Nadim Rouhana (Harvard
University, USA), Dr. Mohammed Shaalan (Al-Azhar University,
Egypt), Dr. Ephraim Ya'ar (Tel-Aviv University, Israel).
The present author was a data analyst and research assistant
throughout the history of the project. None of the
participants in the research was in any way a political
representative of any group whatsoever.
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Palestinians, Israelis, Egyptians and others" (Cohen, 1983).
This was accomplished by assembling a group of researchers
with different national backgrounds (American, Palestinian,
Israeli and Egyptian, and others) and with different
disciplinary affiliations (psychology, sociology,
psychiatry, political science, and anthropology), in order
to design and implement a cross-national study in four
societies.

The "Images in Conflict" study is the only

scientific work of its kind about the Middle East or any
other conflict arena; it is unique in studying people's
attitudes about an ongoing conflict, gathering data
simultaneously in different societies, using a common
research design devised by researchers affiliated with the
different societies involved in the conflict.

In terms of

the present inquiry regarding people's perceptions and
cognitions within different societies about conflict and
peace events in the Middle East, the simultaneous gathering
of data is an essential feature, because the overarching
contextual variable of "historical conflict time" must be
set at the same moment for all societies under
consideration.
Design and Pretesting
The wav that the "Images in Conflict" project was
accomplished —

a cooperative project about an ongoing

conflict carried out by individuals from societies involved
in the conflict —

was as worthy of study as the survey
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itself.

However, for the present purpose it is sufficient

to note that the entire questionnaire was the product of
extensive negotiation among the project directors, and that
the questions about political events to be considered here
are but one element within a broader multi-method approach
to the study of attitudes, beliefs, feelings and opinions
about the Middle East conflict.

The study was designed,

pretested and refined between August, 1981 and January,
1982.
Subjects and sampling
In the "Images in Conflict" project investigators
gathered data in 10 samples in the Middle East and the
United States.

Over 4000 interviews were completed between

March 1 and April 24, 1982, a sampling period timed to end
prior to the Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai peninsula on
April 25, 1982.
Two sampling principles were critical to the project:
(1) that the best possible representation of the population
in question be drawn, to guarantee the accuracy with which
the study data reflect the group's opinions, and (2) that
the samples be directly comparable across national groups.
To reconcile these principles, quota samples were drawn in
the three populations in the Middle East (Israeli Jews,
Palestinians in Israel and Egyptians), and additional random
samples of Israeli Jews and Palestinians in Israel were also
drawn.
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In the present analysis, three of the ten samples are
used —

the quota samples of Israeli Jews, Palestinians in

Israel, and Egyptians.

The quota samples are used instead

of the representative samples in the case of the Israeli
Jewish sample and of the sample of Palestinians living in
Israel, in order to have samples that are directly
comparable with the Egyptian sample, for which no
representative sample could be drawn.
These three samples were drawn using an adaptation of
network or snowball sampling techniques (Granovetter, 1976) .
Each national team used its network of personal
acquaintances (e.g. friends, students) to begin generating a
list of potential interviewees.

In order to increase the

restricted pool of names generated by this procedure, each
person approached was asked to recommend potential
respondents differing from him/her on predetermined
dimensions, as a practical means of penetrating other
political networks at further removes from the research
team's own network (Granovetter, 1973).

A name was not

added to the list of potential respondents until it was at
least two steps away from the research team's own circle of
acquaintances.

Diversification within samples was achieved

by striving to fill with an equal number of respondents each
of the 32 cells of the following 2 to the 5th power property
space:
- sex
- age (above/below 35)
- education (above/below 12 years of schooling)
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- religion/ethnicity2
- location (urban/rural)
The sample sizes are: Israeli quota, 555; Palestinian quota,
251; Egyptian quota, 530.
The demographic profile of the Israeli Jewish sample
is: 54% male, with an average age of 33 years (s.d. - 12.9),
and an average of 12.25 years of schooling (s.d. * 4.4).
The sample is 36% Ashkenazi, 45% Sephardi and 19% 'Israeli'
(i.e. both respondent and respondent's father were born in
Israel).

Most of the respondents are urbanites (30%) or

suburbanites (43%), and the remaining 27% live in rural
areas.
The sample of Palestinians living in Israel is made up
of 49% males, with an average age of 32.6 years (s.d. 12.2), and an average of 10.4 years of schooling (s.d. *
4.7).

Most of the sample is Moslem (70%) and the remaining

30% are Christian.

Most of the respondents are urbanites

(77%), and 23% live in rural areas.
The Egyptian sample is 53% male, with an average age of
31.8 years (s.d. - 11.8), and an average of 12.6 years of
schooling (s.d.- 7.2).

Three quarters of the people in the

2 These were specific to each subsample: Israelis —
Sephardi/Ashkenazi; Palestinians — Moslem/Christian;
Egyptian — Moslem/Copt.
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Egyptian sample are Moslem, and the remaining quarter are
Coptic.

Most people in the sample live in urban areas (58%)

and the remaining 42% reside in rural areas.
The interviewing was carried out by teams of
researchers and their assistants in each of the societies.
In Egypt the bulk of the interviewing was done by graduate
assistants who had been trained to administer the
questionnaire.

In Israel the Dahaf Research Center handled

the interviewing, using Jews to interview Israeli Jews and
Palestinians to interview Palestinians living in Israel.
Data Preparation
All data were transferred to the United States and
prepared for analysis by (1) coding the closed-ended survey
data for entry onto computer tape, and (2) translating the
open-ended text material from Hebrew and Arabic into
English, in preparation for the 'pre-coding' stage.
Bilingual staff members (native speakers of either
Arabic or Hebrew) working on the project in New York
translated the original interviews into English.

A

subsample of interviews from each sample was drawn in order
to develop a 'pre-coding scheme' for classifying the openended text material.

Lists of verbatim answers were

compiled from each of the national samples, and from these,
coding schemata were devised.

The rest of the material was

precoded according to these categories, which were refined
and adjusted as the precoding took place.
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The Interview
The study was designed to investigate the respondents'
experiences of the Middle East conflict at a variety of
levels, using open-ended and close-ended formats.
Individual interviews were used to explore the following six
aspects the respondent's experience.

(1) The interview

asked about the respondent's personal experience with people
from different national backgrounds, and about his/her
willingness to become involved with people from different
national backgrounds 'now' and 'in time of peace'.

(2) The

respondent was asked about his/her basic image of the
conflict —

Who are the main parties involved in the

conflict and what parties needed to resolve the conflict?
What is the nature of the relations between the various
actors in the conflict?

What are the underlying issues and

key dimensions which affect the outcome of the conflict?
(3) The interview tapped the respondent's attitudes about
the dominant political issues of the day —

status of West

Bank/Gaza, the status of Jerusalem, and the future of
Israeli-Egyptian relations.

(4) The interview probed the

more emotional and motivational aspects of the respondent's
experience regarding political conflict, through the use of
photographs and other semi-projective techniques.

(5)

Respondents were queried about various political events
(including the events questions to be considered in the
present study).

(6) The interviewer recorded basic
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background information about the respondent, including sex,
age, religion, marital status, education, as veil as
questions about political identity.
The present inquiry focuses primarily on the questions
about political events, and will draw secondarily on data
from other sections of the "Images in Conflict" study in
interpreting the patterns of thinking within each society
about these events.
The Present Analysis
As part of the "Images in Conflict" project respondents
were asked to discuss (using an open-ended format) "what
would bring about and what would result from" the following
three events in the Middle East:
1. Israeli Air Force bombs Beirut
2. Palestinians attack a bus on the Haifa - Tel Aviv
highway
3. A peace treaty is announced between Israel and
Egypt
The analysis of these interpretations forms the basis of the
present report.
A particular typology was built into the choice of the
events used in the

"Images" project: two stereotypic,

hostile events, where one side is the aggressor and the
other side is victim; and one unusual event (because peace
is by definition unusual in the case of a protracted
conflict) between two of the actors.

In the present study
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it was possible to compare responses to events in which one
group is the aggressor and the other is the victim and vice
versa (events 1 and

2); and responses to negative and

positive events (events 1 and

2, and event 3).

In terms of

the three events taken as a set it is possible to consider
whether explanations of events offered by people in
different societies reveal a consistent, coherent analysis
of the conflict and of the relations between societies, or
whether different events call up different analyses, myths,
scenarios in each case.
The study, an exploratory analysis, was carried out

in

a sequence of stages, each one building upon the findings of
the prior stage.

The first stage examines the content of

the responses to each of the three events; in the second
stage a typology of responses to the events is developed; in
the third stage the distinctive patterns of response across
the three events are the focus.
Stage One; The content of the interpretations
The content of responses to the interview questions was
examined in the first stage of the data analysis.

What are

the basic understandings or meanings of each event within
each of the societies involved in the conflict?

What are

the natural categories people use in thinking about events
in international conflict?

What aspect of an event do

people attend to (the nature of the actor? the effect on
target? strategic aspect? humanistic aspect?

moral nature
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of the act as good or as evil, unjust or aggressive?)?

When

an event occurs, do people consider the basic goals and
intentions of

actors in the conflict?

How do they see

their own national group and the other societies in the
conflict?
The goal of this stage of the analysis was to identify
the basic issues and images that emerge in each society
regarding each event, and to consider to what extent there
is consensus about the meaning of an event.

This was

accomplished by examining the marginals of the precoded data
about political events.
Stag? Tw<?;

Developing a typology of responses

In this stage of the analysis a typology of responses
to the events was developed which identified different
cognitive orientations toward the conflict environment.
These outlooks can be thought of as 'indexed' by the various
types of answers.

In this stage the precoded data about the

events were recoded into various types of responses.
What are the frameworks or categories which are used to
make sense of different types of events -- hostile versus
peaceful, own side versus other side?

Do different types of

events elicit different types of thinking?

Or does the

thinking remain consistent across events?
Are there different frameworks for thinking about
events —

such as moral versus strategic, or expressive

versus adaptive or instrumental?

Are there different types

40

of thinkers or different types of thinking (i.e. do people
think consistently across events, with different people
having different styles of interpretation, or does each type
of event elicit a particular type of thinking across
individuals?)?
Stage Three: Patterns of thinking across events
Finally, the existence of distinctive patterns of
thinking or outlooks or inodes of reasoning about the three
events taken as a set are considered.

Are there differences

in cognitive style or types of thinking which cut across
national groups, or do national groups have distinctive
patterns of interpretation?
These questions are important theoretically because
they address the extent to which societies or subgroups
within societies develop coherent cultural styles, and to
what extant those styles change and are changed by the
evolving conflict environment.

How does each particular act

relate, if at all, to broader images of the conflict, of
possibilities for peace and justice, or revenge and
victimization, or reconciliation?
In this stage latent class analysis (Lazarsfeld, 1954,
1959; Goodman, 1974) is used to identify the existence of
distinctive patterns of response in the data.

If patterns

are shown to exist in the data, the analysis lends support
to the notion that the existence of underlying (latent)
variables account for the observed patterns.
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Hypotheses:
Attribution research has demonstrated that the mere
difference in perspective yields a difference in the
interpreter's explanation of an action.

Experience in the

problem-solving workshop suggests that societies engaged in
conflict develop very different "social constructions of
reality" about the meaning of events in a conflict.

In this

light it is expected that parties to a conflict explain the
'same' events differently:

Israelis, Palestinians and

Egyptians are expected to "read" the three political events
in ways that reflect their particular socio-historical and
practical concerns.
The extent of these differences, however, is expected
to vary not only by nationality, but with each type of
event.

Both events data theory and research on social

cognition have emphasized the importance of the larger
environment in shaping and changing the mental categories or
expectations that people and societies have regarding the
ongoing flow of events they experience.

War events are

expected to be more familiar and predictable in their causes
and consequences than peace events.

Thus, it is expected

that there will be parallel ways of thinking about war
events across societies.

The response of an Israeli to a

Palestinian attack on a bus in Israel may resemble a
Palestinian's response to an Israeli raid on Beirut.

This

resemblance could be explained in terms of "role" similarity
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within the same interaction system: comparing instances when
one's own group is the aggressor versus when one's own group
is the victim in a political event, irrespective of
nationality.
In contrast, a peace action is expected to generate
differences in interpretation among all three of the
national groups.

At the cognitive level the peace action is

expected to unsettle the stereotypic expectations that each
party has of the others — expectations either of alliance or
of rejection.
Finally, it is expected that each society will be
characterized by different patterns of thinking or
reasoning.

These will be distinctive in each of the

societies.
Preparation of the Data for the Present Analysis
Interviewers for the "Images in Conflict" study posed
the questions about the three political events using an
open-ended format, and recorded each respondent's answer
verbatim .

As indicated above, the answers were translated

and then precoded soon after the interviews took place
(Summer and Autumn, 1982), using a precoding scheme which
was devised based on a subset of answers from each of the
national groups sampled.

The precoding schemes are lists

intended to capture the wide range of answers offered in
response to the questions about events (see Appendix A ) .
For each question the coder could record up to two responses
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for 'what led up to' each event and two responses for 'what
results from' each event.

Thus the Intent of the precoding

phase was to capture as much of the phrasing and meaning of
the original (raw) answers as possible, while at the same
time reducing the types of answers enough to permit use of
computer-aided analytic techniques.

All of these steps took

place as part of the "Images in Conflict" project.
The present study takes the precoded data as its
starting point.

Two decisions about technical aspects of

the data were made at the start of this study.

First, since

only a minority of people in each sample offered more than
one answer for "what led up to" an event or "what results"
from it, only one response to "cause" and one response to
"result" for each of the three events is included in the
analyses that follow.
respondent —

Thus there are six variables for each

one cause and one result for each of the three

events: Israeli raid, Palestinian bus and Egyptian-Israeli
treaty.
Next, it is apparent from the marginals that the
proportion of precoded answers to answers coded as "other"
(i.e. not precoded) is not uniform throughout the total
sample, either by group or by event [see Table I.].

This

suggests that certain types of answers within certain groups
were not "captured" by the precoding scheme, and that these
answers need to be reviewed in order to equalize the
proportion of pre-coded to "other" answers.

44

Table 1
Percentage of Answers Coded as "Other" per Sample
for Each Event
Egyptian
(n-530)
Raid
cause
result

24.0
12.8

Palestinian

Israeli

(N-251)

(N-555)

10.0
9.2

4.3
3.6

Bus
cause
result

11.3

8.4
10.0

5.0
3.2

Treaty
cause
result

19.2
10.6

10.0
19.5

5.2
7.0

Overall average

15.1%

11 .2 %

4.7%

12.6

At this point it is not feasible to retrieve and code anew
the large number of responses coded as "other" in the
precoding (particularly in the Egyptian sample).

However,

attempts were made to impute the meaning of the "other"
responses wherever possible, particularly in the case of the
one fifth of the Palestinian sample whose responses to
results of the treaty were precoded as "other".
The "other" answers were handled at the technical level
in two stages.

Initially, cases with "other" answers were

eliminated from the description of the marginals (in the
next section and from subsequent section where the data are
recoded into a typlogy of orientations towards conflict).
Later on, when the patterns of response were the focus,
attempts were made to include as many cases as possible,
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wherever the meaning of an "other" answer can be ascertained
from the overall pattern of a person's responses.

Stage One
Basic Marginals

The aim of the first stage in the data analysis was
to describe the basic understanding that each national group
has of the three events.

This was done in two parts.

First, the pattern of missing answers was considered.
Unlike the data coded "other," where a relatively large
number of cases with "other" answers might suggest
inadequate precoding of the data (a technical problem),
"missing" answers can be said to have a substantive meaning
under certain conditions.

Since the present study was

designed to consider preferred modes of perceiving, it is
important to examine areas of "non-perception" or rejection
among the three events.

It may be that the refusal to deal

with an event, either by refusing to discuss it or even by
denying its occurrence is a characteristic of intense
conflict.
Second, the precoded answers were rank-ordered from the
most frequently occurring responses to the least frequently
occurring responses in each sample (see Appendix B).

Based

on these rank-ordered responses, the view of each national
group for each event was summarized in aggregate terms in
order to paint each sample's understanding in broad strokes.
This descriptive process has two aspects.

One is to

identify key issues elicited by each event within each
society.

This means that in examining a particular sampling

47

group's responses to an event, precodes that seem to mean
the same thing are combined.

A second aspect of description

involves identifying the areas of consensus and of cleavage
within each of the national groups in order to determine
whether there is a modal response to an event, or whether
there are several different responses.

PART ONE:

The Pattern of Missing Answers

There appeared to be a pattern in the "missing" data.
At the aggregate level, the pattern of "missing" answers
suggests that selective perception of the events was
operating.

Table 2 displays these results.

Table 2
Percentage of "Missing" Answers Coded per Sample
for Each Event
Egvotian
(N-530)
Israeli raid
cause
result

Palestinian
(N-251)

Israeli
(N-555)

24.3
27.0

7.2
8.4

11.2
15.0

Palestinian bus attack
cause
24.5
result
28.1

7.6
6.0

11.4
9.4

Egyptian-Israeli treaty
cause
4.0
result
5.5

4.8
8.4

5.2
8.1

Overall average

7.1%

10.1%

18.9%

One fourth of the Egyptian respondents do not answer
the questions about the Israeli raid or the Palestinian
attack, but most Egyptians have something to say about the
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Israeli-Egyptian treaty.

A pattern of response like this

could be read in substantive terms: there appears to be a
reluctance, hesitation or resistance by many Egyptians to
respond to the Israeli and Palestinian hostile interactions,
compared to Egyptian readiness or enthusiasm in responding
to the treaty.

Or, nearly every Egyptian has heard of the

treaty, but not about the raid or the bus attack (Some of
the verbatim answers read, "I have not heard about this
event").

In contrast, Israelis and Palestinians have more

similar response rates across the three events, —

around 85

- 93% of those sampled answered the questions (i.e.
percentage not "missing").

However, the Israeli response

rate to results of Israeli raid appears to be significantly
higher than Israeli response rate to the other events.

This

could be examined further to see whether non-responses is
indicative of, say, Israeli disapproval about a raid on
Beirut.
There were some systematic differences between those
who respond to the events questions and those who do not in
each sample.

In the Egyptian case socio-demographic factors

seem play a role.

For each event those who answered and

those who did not were compared in terms of age, sex,
education level, religion and urban-rural.

For each event

these two types of respondents differed significantly by age
and by sex: the Egyptians who do not answer the questions
tend to be young women.

For Egyptians the treaty is more
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than a political event, in that it penetrates beyond the
usual level of political awareness of much of the
population.
For Egyptians and Israelis the Egyptian-Israeli treaty
seems to be more salient than the other two events, as
suggested by the improved response rate for the EgyptianIsraeli treaty in comparison to the response rates of these
samples for the Israeli raid and the Palestinian bus attack.
However, for Palestinians this is not the case.

Similarly,

both the Israeli and Palestinian samples have more missing
responses in the case of the results of the Israeli raid and
in the case of the cause of the Palestinian bus attack.
The differences among the political events raise
certain questions for this research.

The Israeli raid and

Palestinian bus attack involve hostile, Israeli-Palestinian
interaction, while the Egyptian-Israeli treaty is a more
peaceful, Israeli-Egyptian event.

Either or both of these

aspects (nationality and hostile/peaceful nature of the
event) may explain the tendency of Egyptians to respond to
the questions about the Egyptian-Israeli treaty, but not to
questions about the Israeli raid or the Palestinian bus
attack.

Put another way, who are the (88/530 ■ 17%)

Egyptians who answer questions about the Egyptian-Israeli
peace treaty only?

These questions are examined in greater

depth in the course of this analysis.
In examining the content of responses to the political
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events, cases with "missing** or "other" responses are not
included in the calculation of percentages presented below.
Later on, in Stage Three of the data analysis, most of these
cases will be included in the analysis of patterns of
response across the three events.

PART TWO: The Content of the Responses to the Events

I.

"Israeli Air Force conducts a raid on Beirut"

A.

Israeli View

Most Israelis feel that the Israeli raid on Beirut was
carried out in retaliation for prior attack:
71%
10
19
100%

"retaliation for terrorist attacks"
"retaliation for Palestinian or PLO attacks"
miscellaneous coded categories
(n-469)

There is very little variation in the distribution among
categories.

Nearly all of the answers (97%) involve these

elements: retaliation or protection from terrorist or PLOrelated attacks out of Lebanon.
There is less agreement, however, about the results of
the raid:
30%
17
15
14
9
9
6
100%

"reduce conflict"
"more war, conflict"
"PLO weakened"
"negative world opinion" or "UN response"
"people or innocent people killed"
"terrorists killed"
miscellaneous coded categories
(n«452)
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Approximately half of the Israeli sample think that the most
salient result of the Israeli raid is that the raid
accomplished something, and that it did so by weakening the
PLO and killing terrorists.

However, nearly a third of the

Israelis expect the most salient result to be more war,
increased casualties or an increasingly negative response to
Israel in the world arena as a result of an Israeli raid.

B.

Palestinian view

The Palestinian sample responded in a variety of ways
about the cause of the Israeli raid:
26%
24
24
9
8
9
100%

"Israeli aggression against Arabs"
"desire to destroy Palestinians"
"retaliation for attacks" ["Palestinian,"
"PLO," "terrorist" or "Lebanon" attacks]
"Israeli expansionism"
"war, hatred"
miscellaneous coded categories
(n-208)

These respondents could be divided into 1) the approximately
half of the Palestinians who view the Israeli raid on Beirut
as due to Israeli aggression and Israeli intent to harm
Palestinians, and 2) the nearly one quarter of the sample
who consider the raid a form of Israeli retaliation in
response to attacks on Israel.
Most of the Palestinian sample expect an Israeli raid
to result in more war and casualties; a smaller percentage
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of Palestinians expect some form of Palestinian or PLO
retaliation as a result.
45%
28
9
9
100%

C.

"more conflict"
"people/innocent people/terrorists will be
hurt or killed"
some form of Palestinian or PLOretaliation
miscellaneous coded categories
(n-207)

Egyptian View

The Egyptian sample has a range of ideas about what
would lead up to an Israeli raid on Beirut:
29%
18
15
13
9
16
100%

"Israeli expansionism"
"Israeli aggression against Arabs"
"Beirut is a PLO stronghold"
"Israeli retaliation for Lebanon attacks"
"Israeli attempt to destroy Palestinians"
miscellaneous coded categories
(n-274)

To most Egyptians the Israeli raid is evidence of Israeli
aggression and expansionism.

But more than one quarter of

this sample views the Israelis as acting in response to
attacks.
The question "What will result from the raid?" elicits
greater consensus.

Almost two thirds of the responses coded

involve increased conflict and casualties:
43%
30
7
6
14
100%

"more war"
"people killed"
"retaliation" by Palestinians orPLO
impact on the peace treaty — (4% negative
impact, 2% positive impact on peace)
miscellaneous coded categories
(n-319)

It is noteworthy that a very small percentage of the
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Egyptians explicitly considered the Israeli raid in terns of
its potential impact on the peace process.

d

.

Discussion

Most Palestinians and Egyptians in the study feel that
an Israeli raid on Beirut is caused by Israeli 'disposition'
rather than in retaliation for attacks.

However, Egyptians

emphasize Israeli 'expansionism' in the region —
territorial concept —

a

while Palestinians cite Israeli

aggression and malevolent desire to destroy Palestinians —
a people concept.

In contrast, most Israelis view the raid

as a form of retaliation for prior attacks, or as a pre
emptive strike carried out to prevent future attacks.

Thus,

for many Israelis, security requirements lead up to (and
justify) such a raid.

II.

"Palestinians attack a bus on the Haifa - Tel Aviv

highway"

A.

Israeli view

Most Israeli Jews believe that terrorism and hatred of
Jews lead up to a Palestinian attack on a bus in Israel:
37%
22
9
5
4
23
100%

"terrorist activity"
"hatred of Jews"
"attempt to terrorize civilians"
"interrupt 'normal life' in Israel"
"policy of the PLO
miscellaneous coded categories
(n-464)
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A substantial number of Israelis expect Israel to
retaliate for such an attack.

Many others focus on the

civilian casualties and ongoing conflict which result.
44%
26
16
14
100%

b

.

"Israeli retaliation"
"people killed"
"more war"
miscellaneous coded categories
(n-485)

Palestinian view

Palestinians explain the Palestinian attack in two main
ways: l) as a reaction to prior Israeli actions and
policies; 2) as an action in the name of Palestinian
political resistance.
45%
13
10
6
6
4
16
100%

"retaliation for Israeli attacks"
"Palestinian resistance"
"response to Israeli policies"
"make demands heard"
"desire world attention"
attempt to "regain Palestinian homeland"
miscellaneous coded categories
(n-211)

One could say that more than half the Palestinian sample
sees such a bus attack as provoked by Israeli actions toward
Palestinians, while nearly a third of the sample sees the
bus attack as a form of political expression —

purposive

behavior in terms of "making demands heard", to "regain
Palestinian homeland", motivated by a "desire for world
attention".
Most of the Palestinian sample expect increased
conflict and Israeli retaliation to result from the
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Palestinian bus attack, but a small minority of the
Palestinian sample expects the attack to accomplish
something:
38%
24
16
11
11
100%

c.

"more war"
"retaliation by Israel"
"people killed"
attack as achieving its purposes, such as
"force Israel to recognize Palestinian
rights"
miscellaneous coded categories
(n-211)

Egyptian View

Nearly half of the Egyptians see the Palestinian attack
as a response to prior Israeli actions, compared to more
than a quarter of the sample who see it as politically
expressive or motivated.
36%
28
10
26
100%

some sort of Palestinian or PLO retaliation
Palestinian resistance
"response to Israeli policy"
miscellaneous coded categories
(n-333)

Egyptians explain the results in 3 terms, which, taken
together, point to an escalation of conflict:
36%
24
23
6
11
100%

"more war"
"people, innocent people killed"
"retaliation by Israel"
"affect peace talks negatively"
miscellaneous coded categories
(n-321)

It should be noted that, again, as in the case of results of
the Israeli raid, Egyptians are unique among the three
samples in remarking upon the effects of the bus attack on
peace talks (although only a small group of Egyptians
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mention this).

As in the case of the pattern of missing

data in the Egyptian sample discussed above, where the peace
treaty elicited a much higher response rate among Egyptians
than did the Israeli raid or the Palestinian attack,
Egyptians appear to have a different outlook about the two
hostile actions than either Israelis or Palestinians.

In

this case the small group of Egyptians who think about the
Israeli raid and the Palestinian attack in terms of how
these actions might effect the peace process seem to be
operating out of an analytic framework which is to be
contrasted with the more prevalent notions of either blaming
the aggressor or justifying the action.

D.

Palestinian. Egyptian and Israeli answers compared

Whereas Israelis see the Palestinian bus attack as an
act of terrorism and hatred of Jews which was internally
motivated, most Palestinians and Egyptians talk about this
event in terms of retaliation for Israeli attacks or in
response to Israeli policies, in other words, externally
motivated. However, a third of each of the Arab samples
understands the attack in terms of Palestinian resistance,
or as an attempt to gain world attention in order to make
demands heard.

A greater percentage of Egyptians than

Palestinians use the actual code "Palestinian resistance"
(Egyptians - 29%, Palestinians - 13%), suggesting perhaps
that Egyptians admire and support the Palestinian cause in
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general, whereas Palestinians in Israel are possibly less
sympathetic to or supportive of "Palestinian attacks” as a
means.

Still, 16% o the Palestinians see some sort of

political motivation for the attack.
There is consensus within Israeli society about the
results of a Palestinian attack: more than half of the
Israelis expect some form of Israeli retaliation.

The

Palestinian and Egyptian samples are split between two main
responses: approximately one quarter of each sample
explicitly expect Israel to retaliate and more than one
third of each sample expect "more war", which probably
includes Israeli retaliation as one element.

18% of

Palestinians and 6.5% Egyptians expect that the attack will
accomplish something.

III. "Israel and Egypt announce a peace treaty"

A.

Israeli View

Three main answers account for three quarters of the
Israeli sample's responses:
33%
26
15
26
100%

Sadat
compromise, concessions
Egyptian desire for peace
miscellaneous coded categories
(n-492)

Nearly half of the Israeli sample attributes the treaty to
Sadat and/or Egypt's desire for peace.

But a quarter of the

sample views the treaty as a joint Israeli-Egyptian action
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rather than a purely Egyptian initiative, and at least 7%
emphasize the specifically Israeli-based origins or impetus
of the treaty (whereas only approximately 3t Egyptians or
Palestinians mention even a joint effort).
When asked about the results of the treaty, Israeli
respondents offered two main answers: the possibility of at
least minimal peace or reduced tensions, and concern about
the Sinai peninsula.
21%
17
16
14
7
15
10
100%

"increased chance for peace"
"bilateral Israeli-Egyptian peace"
"normalization of relations"
"lessening of tensions"
"short-term peace"
Sinai — "loss of", "transferral of",
"withdrawal from"
miscellaneous coded categories
(n-471)

Overall, there seems to be a consensus among Israelis (75%)
that the treaty will move relations in a calming direction.
However, for many Israelis this could be a bounded
expectation: nearly one third of this group feels that the
treaty will bring peace limited to the short-term or to
bilateral Israeli-Egyptian interaction, as opposed to more
extensive peaceful relations.

Moreover, 15% of the entire

samples mention the loss of Sinai, which adds to the range
of reactions which exist in Israel about the treaty:
enthusiasm, ambivalence, and skepticism.
Thus, although half of the Israelis sampled expect
positive effects from an Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty,
there nonetheless is a clear awareness in Israeli society
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about what peace 'costs' then.

This is expressed in terns

of concessions, need to conpronise, giving up Sinai and the
security it offered.

B.

Palestinian View

Most people in the Palestinian sanple enphasize the
Egyptian causal role in bringing about the Egyptian-Israeli
treaty.

For then it is an Egyptian-initiated action, and

not a bilateral event, in that around three fourths of the
responses involve 'things about the Egyptians':
21%
21
15
8
8
27
100%

Egyptian desire for peace
"Sadat"
"Sadat's treason"
"Egyptian desire to regain land"
"econonic and social pressure in Egypt"
niscellaneous coded categories
(n-214)

However, the Palestinian sanple seens to be divided
concerning the evaluation of the treaty itself: 42%
Palestinian sanple view "Egyptian desire for peace" and
"Sadat" as responsible for the treaty (without a spelled out
evaluative aspect), whereas at least 15% of the responses
indicate a clearly negative evaluations of Sadat —
instance, "Sadat's treason".

for

It seens clear that nany

Palestinians in Israel are dissatisfied about the IsraeliEgyptian treaty, which they believe left the Palestinians
out of the arrangenents.

The proportion of the responses

would be expected to be even nore negative for other
Palestinian sanples interviewed outside of Israel.
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The Palestinian sanple's expectations about the results
of the treaty support this the feeling of foreboding: around
one quarter focus on inter-Arab and Israeli-Arab tensions,
whereas around one third see a chance of [Israeli Egyptian] peace and normalization of relations.

If

"bilateral peace" and "short-term peace" can be considered
to be qualified answers or mixed evaluations about the
aftermath of a treaty, the answers can be arranged in a
scale ranging from those who see a chance for peace more
enthusiastically to those who expect negative results from
the treaty:
28%

increased chance of peace)

6
10

normalization of relations)
bilateral I-E peace )

4
15
8
71%
29
100%

optimistic
mixed
expectations

short-term peace
)
loss of Arab support for Egypt)
pessimistic
increased conflict
)
[subtotal]
miscellaneous coded categories
(n-181)

Palestinians also mention Sinai (12%), almost as much as
Israeli Jews.

Approximately 6% mention that economy will

improve as a result of the peace treaty, which is not
mentioned at all by Israelis, and is mentioned much more by
Egyptians than Palestinians.
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C.

Egyptian

View

Most Egyptians view Egyptian national desires as
responsible for the Israeli-Egyptian treaty:
49%
15
16
20
100%

Egyptian desire for peace
Sadat
Egyptian desire to regain land
miscellaneous coded categories
(n-407)

Sadat is seen as the cause of the treaty less often in the
Egyptian sample than among Palestinians or Israelis.
When asked about the results of the treaty, around half
of the sample mentions the possibility of Israeli-Egyptian
peace, while around a third emphasize geopolitical and
economic aspects of the treaty.

Compared to Israelis and

Palestinians, Egyptians appear to be unbridled in their
enthusiasm about the peace treaty and its by-products:
47%
19
15
8
3
100%
D.

increased chance of peace
Israeli withdrawal from Sinai
better economy
bilateral Israeli-Egyptian peace
normalization
miscellaneous coded categories
(n-445)

Israeli. Palestinian and Egyptian samples compared

A large percentage of each sample indicates that
Sadat's leadership and/or the Egyptian desire for peace
constitute central factors leading up to the IsraeliEgyptian peace agreement:
Egyptians
64%

Palestinians
41%

Israelis
48%

However, most Egyptians emphasize the desire of the Egyptian
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people, whereas most Israelis and Palestinians emphasize
Sadat's personal role in the peace treaty.

This suggests

that Egyptians emphasize their own [authentic, bottom-up,
rather than top-down] will or impetus (or disposition)
regarding peace, and that Israelis and Palestinians see
Sadat, more than the Egyptian people, as responsible for the
treaty.

But many Palestinians blame Sadat and see the

treaty as a result of a "black-top image" (R. K. White,
1972) —

the Egyptian people forced into an undesirable role

by a treasonous leader, whereas Israelis credit Sadat rather
than the Egyptian people (and thereby temper optimism and
enthusiasm about the treaty with skepticism about the
stability of the Sadat's regime).

In comparison to the

Palestinian view of Sadat, the Israelis' view could be
termed a white-top image.
No clear scenario about what the treaty will bring
emerges from the responses of the three samples.

Each

population seems to emphasize aspects of the future which
embody its own particular concerns.

Thus Egyptians more

than Israelis or Palestinians mention the effects of peace
in improving the economy (cf. "peace and prosperity" slogan
under Sadat);

Palestinians envision increased conflict and

inter-Arab tensions.

Israelis expect a reduction in

tension, but stop short of expressing full-blown enthusiasm
over the possibility of peace "increased chance of peace".
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SUMMARY:
From the marginals it is clear that Israelis, Egyptians
and Palestinians offer different explanations for the causes
and results of the three events.

In fact, it is possible to

identify what could be called 'Israeli' answers or
'Palestinian' or 'Egyptian' answers, since certain
explanations are nearly unique to a given population.

For

instance, more than 80% of the people who think about the
results of the bus attack in terms of its effect on the
peace treaty are Egyptians.

There are also examples of

distinctively Israeli or Palestinian answers for the three
events: Only Israelis see the Palestinian attack as
motivated by the desire "to murder women and children";
only they see the peace treaty as coming about due to
"Israeli concessions".

An example of a distinctively

Palestinian view is the sense that "Sadat's treason" brought
about the Israeli-Egyptian treaty.
There seems to be a changing pattern across events of
similarities and differences among the views of the three
national groups. In the first two events, which involve
Israeli-Palestinian hostile interaction, the Egyptian
answers resemble the Palestinian answers.

But in the case

of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty the views of all three
groups diverge regarding the meaning of the event.

This

seems to be the case despite the fact the a large portion of
each sample mentions "Sadat" and "Egyptian desire for peace"
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as leading up to the event, and "increased chance of peace11
as a result of the treaty.

In examining the answers which

characterize each sample, two points emerge: that each
society has its own set of underlying concerns and hopes
about a treaty (i.e. the is a lack of consensus across all
samples), and that the answers about the treaty seem less
stereotyped than in the case of the two hostile IsraeliPalestinian events.

Stage Two
Categorization of the Variables

In the second stage of the data analysis the goal was
to determine which answers are simply variations on a common
theme and which are representative of different types of
thinking.

The description of the marginals in the first

stage of the data analysis showed how various responses
about an event are connected thematically within each
national sample.

For instance, in the case of the Israeli

sample's explanations of the Israeli raid on Beirut the
following responses seem linked together —

"Beirut is a PLO

stronghold", "pre-emptive strike","prevent attacks" "reduce
conflict", "weaken the PLO", "terrorists killed".
Technically the goal of the second stage of the data
analysis is to reduce the detailed precoding schemes into a
simpler typology of responses.
The second

stage involved combining answers that are

similar and separating those which are different.

To do

this it was necessary to make a judgement about the basic
meaning of the phrase as used by the respondent.

Generally

this judgement is rather straightforward, as in the case of
factors leading up to the attack on the bus: "desire to
murder women and children" is coded as "blame", and "to
regain Palestinian land" is coded as 'political-strategic'.
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However, sometimes the meaning of an answer is more
ambiguous.

For instance, one explanation of what led up to

the Palestinian attack on the bus is "it is the policy of
the PLO".

This could be categorized as 'political'

Palestinian resistance) or as 'blame'

(part of

(i.e. terrorism).

Since mainly Israelis say this, it has been recoded as
'terrorism,' but were it mainly a Palestinian answer, it
might have been called 'political.'

Had this category been

offered by Israelis and Palestinians (and/or Egyptians), its
meaning might have been judged to be different, and a way
would have been sought to recode it meaningfully across the
samples.

In such cases, the meaning of the response is

clarified by considering which national group offers a
particular response.
Even within a sample, the meaning of a response can be
unclear.

For instance, in the case of the Israeli sample's

explanations of what results from the Palestinian attack on
the bus, "terrorists killed" could be judged as being in the
same category as "people killed" and "innocent people
killed" or as belonging to a different category of response.
This ambiguity was resolved by examining the correlations of
these responses and various attitude measures from other
sections of the "Images" study, which reveal that they
behave similarly.

Thus, they were collapsed into one unit.

These examples illustrate a process in the data
analysis which could be called 'disambiguation' —

an
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attempt to clarify the meaning of a particular expression by
referring to who uses it or how it is used (in relation to
other variables).

In this study it was essential to

identify the anthropological meaning or 'meaning in context'
of the response provided by the speaker, rather than simply
relying on a supposed 'dictionary' meaning of an expression.
The process is one of reconstruction:

trying to place the

particular phrase or expression within the larger contextual
framework that it comes from —

a framework which, in this

study, is left unspecified in the interaction between the
respondent and the interviewer since both people are from
the same national background and share common assumptions.
A final issue regarding the categorization strategy
emerges when the researcher examines the list of answers to
the questions about political events.

It is clear that not

all responses involve comparable elements, because people
responded to the questions in a variety of ways: some
answers emphasize what is going on, as in the case where
"peace talks" are seen as leading up to the Israeli-Egyptian
treaty.

Other answers reveal the speaker's evaluation of

the action, as well as an emotional tone or mood: "Sadat's
treason", "it couldn't happen", "they were afraid to attack
the army".
The coding schemes used in this study are developed to
capture the range of responses about each of the events, in
order to define distinctive orientations about conflict and
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peace.

The assumption is that different types of responses

index, albeit imprecisely, different orientations towards
conflict and peace.

The broad goal is to identify these

underlying outlooks about political events.
Coding Schemes Used
From the examination of the precoded data in Stage One
it was evident that the questions about the Israeli raid on
Beirut and the Palestinian attack on the bus (both cause and
result) elicit a comparable types of response,

while the

questions about the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty call up a
different set of responses altogether.

Thus the two hostile

Israeli-Palestinian events (raid and bus attack) are coded
using a common scheme, whereas the treaty requires a
separate formulation.

The scheme used to code the hostile

events is discussed first, followed by the coding schemes
used for the peace event.

Appendix C contains detailed

tables of all coding schemes.
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I.

Hostile Events: Israeli Raid and Palestinian

Attack
The typology of responses for 'what led up to' and
'what resulted from' the Israeli raid and the Palestinian
attack is presented first (in part A.)* followed by a
comparison of the distributions of types of responses for
each national group (in part B.).

A.

Typology of Responses to the Hostile Events

The coding scheme divides the responses into four types
of answers about what leads up to hostile actions:
retaliation, political-strategic, blaming, or conflict-forgranted.

These are assumed to be discrete types of answers

about the causes of hostile political events such as a raid
or an attack, which reflect different cognitive orientations
or outlooks about the nature of ongoing conflict.
1)

Retaliation for enemy's actions. The reasoning
here is that the action took place because of the
other side's prior action, 'we do it because they
do it'. In other words, this is a reactive,
stimulus-response orientation. This mode of
response blames nobody in particular for the
hostile action, although the respondent has
automatic sympathy with one group rather than the
other by virtue of his/her affiliation. The cycle
itself is not morally tinged — one just has a
preferred side, like a favorite team in a game.
The actions themselves do not arouse surprise or
strong emotions. Thus, "The Israeli Airforce
conducted a raid on Beirut" because "they had been
attacked". Likewise, "Palestinians attack the bus
in response to Israeli attacks", or "in response to
Israeli policies".
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2)

Political-strategic goals or concerns. Political
scientists, economists or game theoreticians might
term this the 'rational actor model': an actor
engages in the rational pursuit of its [perceived]
interests, and seeks to achieve certain strategic
goals. In the case of the Israeli raid this outlook
is expressed by answers which emphasize Israel's
security needs ("Beirut is a PLO stronghold", "pre
emptive strike".
In the case of the Palestinian
attack this category includes answers which
explained the attack in terms of Palestinian
resistance, liberation of Palestinian homeland,
making demands heard. This type of answer involves
goal attainment by the acting side.

3)

Blaming the perpetrator of the hostile action.
Answers in this category explain the hostile act in
terms of the evil or diabolical disposition of the
actor. There is an attribution of purposive, selfmotivated choice of violent methods
In the
Israeli raid this category include "Israeli
aggression" "Israeli desire to destroy
Palestinians". In the case of the Palestinian
attack this category subsumes "terrorism", "hatred
of Jews", "desire to terrorize civilians, murder
women and children" and "they were afraid to attack
the army".

4)

Conflict-for-granted. In this category hostile
events are situated beyond the realm of normal
causes and effects.
In this mode the conflict
itself has become a permanent part of the
environment, like floods, earthquakes and other
natural disasters. This fatalistic attitude is
characterized by answers in which the ongoing
conflict environment is seen as the reason for
violence.
For instance this category includes
answers in which "status quo", "war, hatred", or
"no reason" are offered as leading up to either the
Israeli raid on Beirut or Palestinian attack on a
bus.

The results of the hostile events were categorized
according to a similar scheme:
l)

Retaliation bv the attacked party against the
perpetrator. The reasoning here is that 'if one
side starts it, the other will respond', a
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stimulus-response model in which these are the
'rules of the game'. As a result of the Israeli
raid on Beirut there will be 'Palestinian
retaliation', or 'Israeli retaliation' in the case
of the Palestinian attack.
2)

Achieve goals. The actor is seen as being
successful in attaining particular strategic or
political goals as a result of the action. This
category includes responses which seem to be
ideologically-based, in that the particular action
which leads to such results is understood as part
of a larger, coherent plan.
In the case of Israeli
raid this category includes "reduction of
conflict", "weaken the PLO".
In the case of the
Palestinian attack this includes "world attention",
"achieve the objective of stating their cause".

3)

People killed. This category includes responses
which blame the perpetrator of the hostile action,
in that where there are inhuman causes of evil
actions, there are human costs which result. These
answers focus on the destruction of people,
"innocent people" — individual lives.

4)

More w ar. This category involves a fatalistic
stance about the results of hostile actions.
It
probably includes aspects of the other categories,
such as "retaliation" and "people die" as elements
of a more general image of what follows from a
hostile action in a protracted conflict. Some
answers consider the results .of the hostile action
in terms of ongoing conflict, more hatred, anger,
and hostility. Other response include "nothing".

72

B.
Comparison across Samples of Coding Schemes for
Cause and Results of Hostile Events
1.
Events

Comparison of Explanations of Cause of Hostile

Table 3 shows a comparison across the three national
samples of the types of responses used to explain 'what
would bring about an Israeli raid on Beirut' and 'what would
bring about a Palestinian attack on an Israeli bus'.
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Table 3
Comparison Across Samples of Explanations of Cause of
Hostile Events (reported in column percentages)
1. ISRAELI RAID
Sample:
Ecrvptian
Response:
Retaliation
Strateaic

n

-

951

23.6%
10.6
62.0
3.8
100 %

13.5%
21.9
57.3
_Li.3
100 %

Conflict
Totals
-

274

Palestinian

+

208

Israeli
80.2%
15.6
2.3
1»9
100 %
—

+

469

chi-square statistics:
pearson
463.0
likelihood ratio 543.60
degrees of freedom
6
significance
.001
2. PALESTINIAN ATTACK
Sample:
Eavotian
Response:
Retaliation
Strateaic

Blame
Conflict

Totals

n ■

1008

Palestinian
54.5%
28.9
11.8
4_l7
100 %

45.6%
35.4
10.2

U
100 %
333

+

211

Israeli
4.3%
9.1
80.8
100 %

+

464

chi-square statistics:
pearson
535.99
likelihood ratio 603.67
degrees of freedom
6
significance
.001

Most Israelis view the raid as retaliation for prior
actions, whereas the majority of Palestinians and Egyptians
blame Israel for the raid.

In contrast, the Palestinian bus
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attack produces the opposite response: Israelis blame
Palestinians for the attack, whereas most Palestinians and
many Egyptians view the attack as a retaliation for prior
actions.

The victimized blame, whereas the aggressors

justify, or at least explain away the action.

There is more

consensus about this among Israelis than for either
Palestinians or Egyptians.

Nonetheless this is the modal

response for each of the national groups.
However, subgroups within the Palestinian and Egyptian
samples see the Israeli raid as retaliation, similar to the
Israeli interpretation.

Similarly, subgroups within the

Palestinian and Egyptian samples talk about the Palestinian
attack in terms of blame (i.e. emphasizing the aspect of
intentional harm of the attack).

It is possible that the

Palestinian and Egyptian respondents who explain the bus
attack as an intentional action are either supporting or
condemning the action,

it is impossible, however, to

determine from the marginals alone which is the case,
although ultimately the analysis of patterns of response to
the events (in Stage Three) may illuminate this point.
Political-strategic thinking appears to be a secondary
response in explaining one's own actions for all of the
samples, especially among Egyptians.

The percentages of

each sample responding in strategic terms seems to increase
when a group explains its own side's aggressive act: More
Palestinians and Egyptians use political-strategic terms to
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explain the Palestinian attack than they do to explain the
Israeli raid.

More Israelis use strategic terms to explain

the Israeli raid than they do to explain the Palestinian
attack.

Thus political-strategic reasoning seems to

function as an alternative form of justification for the
hostile action of one's own side.

Rather than the sort of

justification which denies that the action was intended by
the actor, political-strategic explanations describe the
actor as having longer term, more thought-out motives, and
as acting with these goals in mind, while not particularly
seeking to do harm or to punish, as in the blaming mode.

In

contrast to the retaliatory explanation, in which the actor
is at the mercy of the Other's prior actions, the politicalstrategic outlook reasserts the control of the actor over
the environment.
Only a small percentage of people in each sample
explain these hostile events in terms of the conflict
environment ('conflict-for-granted'), although a larger
percentage of Egyptians seem to think this way compared
the other two samples.

to

This Egyptian tendency appears in

other sections of the questionnaire as well.
2. Comparison of Explanations of Results of Hostile
Events
Table 4 shows a comparison across national samples of
the types of responses used to describe results of the two
hostile Israeli-Palestinian interactions.
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Table 4
Comparison Across Samples off Explanations of Results of
Hostile Events (reported in column percentages)
1. ISRAELI RAID
Sample:

Egyptian

Palestinian

Response:
12.9%
Retaliation
Achieve aoals 7.5
30.7
People die
Mors -tfflr
Totals
100 t
n

-

319

978

18.8%
4.9
29.5
45,9
100 %
+

207

Israeli
21.2%
45.8
17.7
15.3
100 %

+

452

chi-square statistics:
pearson
255.86
likelihood ratio 276.74
degrees of freedom
6
significance
.001
2. PALESTINIAN ATTACK
Sample:
Egyptian

Palestinian

Response:
25.9%
Retaliation
Achieve Goals 6.5
24.3
People Die

43., 3.

Here JSar

Totals

n -

1017

-

321

25.1%
18.5
16.0

52.4%
2.7
26.8

45,2

1^1

100 %

100 %

+

Israeli

211

100 %

+

485

chi-square statistics:
pearson
153.95
likelihood ratio 149.71
degrees of freedom
6
significance
.001

"More war" is the modal answer among Palestinians and
Egyptians for both the Israeli raid and the Palestinian
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attack.

"People die" is the second choice In discussing the

results of an Israeli raid.

Are these expressions

indicative of distinctive outlooks or are they different
ways of expressing the same thing?

Functionally they seem

to operate similarly, in that they are used more often by
the population which identifies with the victim in an action
(i.e. Palestinians and Egyptians in the case of "Israeli
Airforce conducts a raid on Beirut", and Israelis in the
case of "Palestinians attack a bus on the Haifa - Tel Aviv
highway"). They seem to express a degree of despair and
victimization in the face of ongoing conflict.
'Achieve goals'

(i.e. reduce conflict) is the modal

response among Israelis concerning results of the Israeli
raid, and most Israelis expect Israeli retaliation for the
Palestinian attack.

Both of these categories imply a degree

of Israeli efficacy or responsiveness toward the conflict.
However, a portion of the Israeli sample expects Palestinian
retaliation for the raid (Palestinian responsiveness), and,
in the case of the Palestinian attack, many Israelis talk
about the results in terms of people dying (helplessness or
despair brought on by the conflict).

3. Explanations of Cause and Results of Hostile Events
Comparing the information gained from looking at
'causes' and 'results' of hostile actions, it is clear that
'what results from' a hostile action generates fewer
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differences between the national groups than 'what leads up
to' a hostile action.

Among Palestinians and Egyptians

there seems to be a constant percentage of people who say
that "more war" will result from these events, whereas
Israelis seem split between those who view Israeli actions
as being efficacious (Israeli raid will "reduce conflict",
and Palestinian attack will result in "Israeli
retaliation".) and those who are more despairing.
Many people expect more war and ongoing conflict to
result from hostile actions, but very few people see the
conflict environment as the cause or antecedent of these
sorts of actions.

This suggests the psychological nature of

cause of hostile action, as compared to the pragmatic nature
of consequences.

In other words, a wider range of

expression is elicited by 'what led up to' an action than by
'what results from it', and one could probably identify a
respondent's nationality on the basis of his/her explanation
of the what led up to a hostile action, but not on the basis
of 'results' of an action.

In general, the explanations of

results of the hostile events seem less helpful or
explanatory than explanations about the causes of the
hostile events in revealing the different orientations
underlying explanations of the events.
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II.

Peace Event: Israell-Egyptian Peace Treaty

From the beginning of the data analysis it appeared
that this event would require a different coding scheme from
the one used to categorize the responses to the hostile
events, because the way people talked about the peace treaty
seemed to differ from how they explained the raid and the
attack.

Peace is a different matter than war.

It is not

simply the opposite of war; it is less familiar and it has a
different logic.

Two different schemes are used to recode

•what would bring about' the treaty, and two for 'what would
result from' the treaty.

For each of the coding schemes the

rationale for the scheme is presented along with a
comparison of the distribution of responses across national
samples, before moving on to the subsequent scheme.

A.
1.

Coding Schemes for Cause of the Treaty
Cause of the Israel1-Egyptlan Treaty; Scheme #1

One way to differentiate the explanations of 'what
would bring about* the Israeli-Egyptian treaty was to divide
the responses according to which people's concerns or needs
are expressed in a particular answer.
answers could be called 'Israeli needs'

Thus, one group of
(e.g. "Arab

recognition of Israeli") and a second could be called
'Palestinian needs'

("recognition of Palestinian rights").
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A third group of responses involve Egyptian desire for peace
and/or Sadat's contribution.

A fourth group of answers

includes more pragmatic or instrumental concerns:
a)

Israeli contribution, concerns, requirements. For
instance "Begin", "Israeli concessions", "Arab
recognition of Israel".

b)

Palestinian contribution, concerns, requirements.
For instance, "recognition of Palestinian
homeland", "Sadat's treason", "can't happen",
"extra-regional involvement".

c)

Egyptian contribution. Sadat. "Egypt's desire for
peace", "Sadat", "Sadat the visionary".

d)

Pragmatic concerns. "Desire for a better economy",
"1973 War", "Egyptian desire to regain land",
"negotiations".

The results of this coding scheme are displayed in
Table 5.
Table 5
Comparison of Across Samples of Explanations of Cause of_the
Israeli-Egyptian Treaty (reported in column percentages)
Sample:
Egyptian

Palestinian

Israeli

6.5%
27.6
40.7
25.2
loo %

36.6%
3.2
47.5
12.7
100 %

Response:
3.7%
Israeli Concerns
4.9
Palestinian Concerns
Egyptian Concerns or Sadat 61.7
Pragmatic Concerns
28 l2
Total
100 %
-

n

-

chi-square
degrees of freedom
significance

1118

-

407
311.14
A
.001

+

214

+

497
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Although all three samples acknowledge Egyptian Impetus
leading up to treaty, each group has its own outlook about
the treaty: Egyptians emphasize pragmatic aspects of their
experience, such as improving the economy, the October
(1973) War and regaining the Sinai; Israelis speak
especially of "mutual desire, compromise", suggesting they
want an interchange with a negotiating partner; Palestinians
talk about "Sadat's treason" and "extra-regional
involvement" as leading up to a treaty of which many
disapprove, on the one hand.

On the other hand, a subgroup

of Palestinians describes the treaty as coming about due to
Egypt's pragmatic concerns about Sinai, the economy, and
internal social pressure.

2. Cause of the Israeli-Egyptian Treaty: Scheme #2
The second recoding scheme was based on an underlying
notion of volition or motivation for the peace treaty, in
that each of the parties desires in different degrees to
join into or to acknowledge the Israeli-Egyptian agreement
about a peace treaty.

These responses vary according to the

extent that the respondent is willing to join in the
responsibility for the agreement:
a)

The peace treaty was adopted because there was
something to be gained. Answers such as "economy"
or "regain land" are included here.

b)

A negotiation framework made the peace treaty
possible, and the various parties or leaders sought
the treaty. This category included "Sadat",
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"Egyptian desire for peace", "Israeli desire for
peace", "leadership", "Egypt, Israel, USA",
"Begin", "negotiations".
c)

Exchanges or concessions made the treaty possible.
"Israeli concessions", "recognition of Palestinian
rights", "Arab recognition of Israel".

d)

Circumstances forced the parties into the treaty.
"The 1973 (October) War", "extra-regional
involvement or pressure".

e)

The Israeli-Egyptian treaty is.a betrayal.

The
answers subsumed here include: "it can't happen",
"Sadat's treason".

The results of this coding scheme are displayed in
Table 6.
Table 6
Comparison of Across samples of Explanations of Cause of the
Israeli-Eoyptian Treaty (reported in column percentages)
Sample:
Egyptian
Response:
Things to be Gained
22.4%
Negotiation Framework
68.3
Exchanges or Concessions

Forced ..cr Betrayed*
Total

n -

Palestinian
12.6%
51.4
3.7

1118

chi-square statistics:
pearson
likelihood ratio
degrees of freedom
significance

- 407

4.8%
59.4
5.1

30»9

100 %

214

27.6

S^-2.

100 t

+

Israeli

100 %

+

497

250.15
240.96
6
.001

* The categories 'forced to make peace' and 'the treaty
is a betrayal' are combined in this table.

The majority of people in all three samples speak of
negotiations involving various combinations of Egypt, Sadat,
Israel, Begin, USA, etc. as leading up to an IsraeliEgyptian treaty.

These are elements in an idealistic
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conception of peace.
The secondary responses for each sanple reveal greater
variation among the three national groups:

a) Egyptians

think about the treaty in terms of things to be gained or
incentives; b) Israelis emphasize concessions, or what they
feel they must exchange or give up for peace; c)
Palestinians respond to the treaty in terms of its
involuntary nature —

they view the participants as being

forced by circumstances or themselves as being betrayed by
the evolution of such an agreement at all.

Differences

among the secondary responses of the three samples indicate
that in each of the societies there are substreams of
thought about the peace treaty, aside from the dominant or
modal response, which appear to involves a more pragmatic
conception of peace, compared to the essentially idealistic
image contained in the modal response.
B. Coding Schemes for Explanations of Results of the
Treaty
l. Results of the Israeli-Egyptian Treaty; Scheme #1
Two ways of grouping the responses to the question
'what results from the Israeli-Egyptian treaty' were used.
In the first scheme expressions about the possibility of
peace are separated from those involving worsening relations
and from concern about the Sinai, or about the economy.
This scheme preserves somewhat the distinction between more
idealistic aspects of peace ('peace' versus

'increased
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tensions') and pragmatic aspects of peace ('economy' versus
•Sinai'):
a)

Peace, "increased chance of peace", "reexamine
Arab attitudes toward Israel", "lessening of
tensions", "normalization of relations", "short
term peace".

b)

Sinai. "Israeli withdrawal from Sinai", "transfer
of Sinai", "loss of Sinai and the security it
provided".

c)

Increased Conflict, "increased conflict", "loss of
Arab support for Egypt", "Sadat's assassination",
"bad for Israel", "bad for Palestinians", "bad for
Egyptians", "it can't happen".

d)

Economy.

"Better economy".

The results of this coding scheme are displayed in
Table 7.
Table 7
Comparison of Across Samples of Explanations of Results of
the Israeli-Ecrvptian Treaty (reported in column percentages)
Sample:
Egyptian
Response:
Chance of Peace
Sinai
Increased Tensions
Economy
Total
n -

1097

chi-square
degrees of freedom
significance

60.7%
18.7
5.5
15.1
100 %
445

Palestinian Israeli
49.1%

74.9%
15.1
6.0

12.2

31.6
5.5
100 %
+

181

100 %

+

471

163.00
6
.001

This scheme shows that in each of the three samples
there are people who expect peace to result from the treaty:
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three-fourths of the Israeli sample speak of the possibility
of peace arising from the treaty compared to nearly twothirds of the Egyptians and around half of the Palestinian
sample.
Secondarily Israelis think about the transfer of the
Sinai, as do the Egyptians.

However, for Israelis the "loss

or transferral of Sinai" is a consequence or effect of
peace, whereas for Egyptians (and probably for Palestinians)
"regaining the Sinai" is part of the content of peace. The
Egyptians also show a concern about improving their economy;
in contrast a strong minority of Palestinians expect an
increase in tensions to result from the treaty.

2. Results of the Israeli-Eqyptlan Treaty; Scheme #2
The second recoding scheme about results of the
Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty is based on the evaluative
aspect of the action, which vary in the three societies.
The answers are divided into good, bad or uncertain results.
Two codes, "withdrawal from Sinai" and "Sinai transferred"
are coded as 'good' for the Egyptian and Palestinian
samples, but as 'unclear' for the Israeli sample.
a)

Good results. These answers have an optimistic
aspect to them: "increased chance for peace",
"better economy", "reeexamine Arab attitudes
towards Israel", "lessening tension",
"normalization".

b)

Unclear or mixed results, "short-term peace",
"bilateral peace (only)", "no results".
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c)

Negative results, "loss of Arab support for
Egypt”, "Sadat's assassination” , "loss of Sinai and
security", "bad for Israel", "bad for
Palestinians", "bad for Egypt” .

The results of this recoding scheme are displayed in
Table 8
Table 8
the Israeli-Eovotian Treaty (reported in column percentages)
Sample:
EavDtian
Response:
Good Results
85.3
Unclear or Mixed Results
9.9
Bad Results
4.8
Total
100. %
n -

1097

445

chi-square statistics:
pearson
likelihood ratio
degrees of freedom
significance

+

Palestinian Israeli
54.5
37.2
S-s_3
100 %

52.5
17.1
3<?»5
100.1%
181

+

471

199.25
181.40
4
.001

This scheme indicates that Egyptians are overwhelmingly
enthusiastic about the results of the peace treaty, although
around half of the Palestinian and Israeli samples could be
said to be optimistic.

More than a third of the people in

the Israeli sample express reservations about what the
treaty will bring, and nearly half of the Palestinians
interviewed expect bad or at least uncertain results from
the treaty.
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III. Construct Validity

It was necessary to devise one coding scheme for the
hostile events and a separate scheme for the treaty, a
finding which lends support to the proposition that conflict
and peace occupy different domains of reasoning.

The

commonalities in the interpretation of the events by the
three samples underscores or confirms the underlying
structure of the events as a series: two hostile or war
events -- one carried out by Israelis and one by
Palestinians —

and one cooperative or peace event between

Israel and Egypt.
The Israeli raid and the Palestinian attack can be
treated as nearly symmetric, in that each group interprets
its own hostile action in justificatory terms and explains
the other group's hostile action in terms of desire to kill,
terrorism, or intentional aggression.

Aggressor and victim

have polarized views, no matters whether Israelis or
Palestinians are in the actor's role.

This occurs despite

the structural differences that no doubt characterize
Israeli and Palestinian societies: one with a state and an
army, and borders, etc., and one without (but with a
national identity and national aspirations and a liberation
movement..).
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The peace treaty elicits areas of consensus or
agreement across groups:

Egypt and/or Sadat are strongly

associated with the treaty, and the treaty is discussed in
terms of a negotiation framework.

But strong differences

emerge between the groups, too:
1) Egyptians credit themselves and speak about expected
benefits or gains as incentive for joining in the
treaty. "Peace and prosperity" was the carrot leading
up to the treaty, and there is overall optimism about
what the treaty will bring.
2) After crediting Sadat and the negotiation framework,
Israelis look at the treaty in terms of what they must
give up to get it (concessions).

As a consequence,

there is a large percentage of Israelis who are
uncertain about what the treaty will bring, although
most people are optimistic.
3) Palestinians

are split between those who credit the

Egyptians and those who blame Sadat or Egypt for the
treaty (thus they see the treaty as a hostile action.).
Expectations are divided about whether the treaty will
bring positive or negative results.
Thus, the Israeli-Egyptian treaty is not perceived uniformly
as a peace action.

Egyptians and Israelis do not agree

about its meaning, although people in each society may view
it as a 'peace-related action', whereas among Palestinians
there is a group of people who view its impact as outright
hostile.
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Another way to evaluate the structure of the three
stimulus actions taken as a set (construct validity) was to
examine the pattern of between-group differences across the
events.

The recategorization of the six events variables in

Tables 3 - 8

indicates that there is a strong association

between nationality and type of explanation which holds for
all three events, as indicated by the statistically
significant chi-square statistics in these tables.

In other

words, for each of the political events there are
differences between the explanations of the events offered
by each of the three national groups.

However, the pattern

of similarities and differences between the responses of
groups was expected to differ for hostile and peace-related
events.

For instance, the views of Egyptians and

Palestinians may be more similar for the hostile events
(Israeli raid and Palestinian bus attack) than they are in
the case of the Egyptian-Israeli treaty.
Table 9 shows the changing pattern of 'alliances' or
similarities and differences in outlook, based on the
partitioning of the likelihood ratio chi-square statistics.
These statistics are taken from Table 3 (cause of Israeli
raid and Palestinian bus attack), Table 4 (results of
Israeli raid and Palestinian bus attack), Table 6 (cause of
peace treaty, using the 'volition' coding scheme) and Table
8 (results of peace treaty, using coding scheme #2 'evaluative').

For each event this table lists: l) the
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overall likelihood ratio chi-square statistic, indicating
the extent of differences between the views of the three
national groups; 2) the amount of difference due to Arab
(Palestinian + Egyptian) versus Israeli differences in
outlook; 3) the amount of difference accounted for by
Egyptian versus Palestinian outlooks.
The two hostile Israeli-Palestinian events were
expected to elicit strong Arab - Israeli differences (i.e.
large chi-square statistic) and weak inter-Arab (Palestinian
- Egyptian) differences.

In contrast, the treaty was

expected to produce divergent accounts (large chi-square
statistics) among the three national groups.
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Table 9
Partitioning of Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square: COBBflrlng the
Pattern of Differences between the National Groups*

chi-sq. df
Samples Compared:
Egyptian - Palestinian - Israeli
Arab samples - Israeli
Egyptian - Palestinian

543.60
524.62
18.97

6
3
3

sign.
.001
.001
.001

RAID2 (result)
chi-sq. df sign.

Sflmpleg-gpffipared:

Egyptian - Palestinian - Israeli
Arab samples - Israeli
Egyptian - Palestinian

276.74
272.20
4.53

6
3
3

.001
.001
.21

BVSl Icause)
chi-sq. df sign.

Samples.Compared:

Egyptian - Palestinian - Israeli
Arab samples - Israeli
Egyptian - Palestinian

603.67
596.61
7.06

6
3
3

.001
.001
.07

BUS2 (result)
chi-sq. df sign.
Samples Compared:
Egyptian - Palestinian - Israeli
Arab samples - Israeli
Egyptian - Palestinian

149.71
129.56
20.15

6
3
3

.001
.001
.001

TREATY1 (cause)
chi-sq. df sign.
Samples Compared:
Egyptian - Palestinian - Israeli
Arab samples - Israeli
Egyptian - Palestinian

240.96
167.80
73.16

6
3
3

.001
.001
.001

TREATY2 (result)
chi-sq. df sign.
Samples Compared:
Egyptian - Palestinian - Israeli
Arab samples - Israeli
Egyptian - Palestinian

181.40
97.25
84.15

4
2
2

.001
.001
.001

*The chi-square statistics used here are taken from Table 3
(RAID1, BUS1), Table 4 (RAID2, BUS2), Table 6 (TREATY1) and
Table 8 (TREATY2).
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Table 9 shows that the two hostile actions (RAID and
BUS) produce a similar pattern of response across the three
groups —

The

Palestinian and Egyptian samples respond to

these actions in a similar way, whereas Israelis respond
differently.

The overall differences between the three

groups on the RAID1, RAID2, BUS1 and BUS2 is made up of two
component parts: the larger chi-square statistic based on
Arab - Israeli differences in explanation, and the much
smaller chi-square statistic summarizing Egyptian Palestinian differences in explanation (Although the
Egyptian-Palestinian difference for RAID1 and BUS2 are
statistically significant, the sheer magnitude of the Arab Israeli comparison predominates.).
However, the chi-square statistics for these betweengroup comparisons change regarding the Israeli-Egyptian
treaty (TREATY).

The differences between the views of each

of the three national groups are more pronounced for TREATYl
and TREATY2 than in the case of the first two hostile
actions (RAID and BUS). This is seen in the larger chisquare summarizing the difference between Egyptian and
Palestinian outlooks, which in the case of TREATY2 (results
of the treaty) are nearly as pronounced as the Arab Israeli differences.

No 'alliances' in outlook could be

said to exist regarding the treaty.
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The notion of patterns of response across events is
useful not only at the between-group level.

There are

varying degrees of consensus within societies in response to
the different types of events. Table 10 shows the patterns
of modal answers identified in each of the samples.
Israelis clearly agree among themselves about when they are
victims, in the case of both hostile events.

Egyptians

display consensus about their role in initiating the peace
treaty, and about what they will gain from it.

Lower

percentages for the modal responses of the Palestinian
sample suggest that this sample is characterized by two
streams of thought in response to each event, rather than a
unified point of view.
Table 10
Modal Responses to the Events in each of the Samples

Raid

Egyptian

Palestinian

Israeli

cause:
n -

blame 57%
(274)

blame 62%
(208)

retaliation 80%
(469)

result:
n -

more war 49%
(319)

more war 47%
(207)

less war 46%
(452)

Bus
cause:
n -

retaliation 46%
(333)

retaliation*59% blame 81%
(211 )
(464)

result:
n -

more war 43%
(321)

more war 40%
(211 )

retaliation 52%
(485)

cause:
n -

negotiation 68%
(407)

negotiate 51%
(214)

negotiate 59%
(497)

result:
n -

good 85%
(445)

good 52%
(181)

good 55%
(471)

Treaty

* 'Retaliation' for the Palestinian sample includes
'conflict-for-granted', also.
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So far the discussion has focused on the results of the
analyses of the aggregate data for Israelis, Palestinians,
and Egyptians.

Modal answers have been identified in each

of the samples about each of the political events.

In the

third stage of the research, the patterns of answers given
within each of the

populations were analyzed, to determine

whether there are different types of thinkers or thinking
within each society and who or what constitute these
substreams.

The task involves identifying patterns of

perceiving across events within each of the national
samples.

Stage Three
Patterns of Thinking Across Events

Prior to this stage the responses to the three
political events have been treated in aggregate terns on a
sample by sample basis.

In Stage Three the response

patterns of individuals within each sample are analyzed to
determine how the understandings of the three events are
linked by individual people.

The main question is whether

there are distinctive patterns of response within each of
the national groups.

The modal answers identified for each

national group in Stage Two form the basis of an analysis of
patterns of response within each of the three samples.
Using latent class analysis (Lazarsfeld, 1954,1959; Goodman,
1974; Clogg, 1977), patterns of modal and non-modal
responses within each national group are examined
statistically for the existence of characteristic patterns
of interpretation across the three events.
The rationale for latent class analysis is that the
empirical data are an imperfect measure of an underlying
construct which itself is not directly observable or
measurable.

Use of latent class analysis enables the

researcher to identify characteristic patterns among the
responses to a set of categorical items and to test whether
the patterns observed in the empirical data can be accounted
for by positing an underlying, latent construct.
restricting the analysis to the examination to the

Instead of
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intercorrelations between individual pairs of items, use of
latent class analysis permits examination of the patterning
among a set of items as a whole (in this case the responses
to the questions about political events).

In the present

research the existence of latent classes would lend support
to the notion that different outlooks, worldviews or reality
worlds within each national group result in different
patterns of response to the questions about political
events.

If the responses to the items are random (i.e. no

patterning is identified by latent class analysis) then
either there is no underlying construct or the items do not
accurately reflect an underlying construct which in fact
exists.
This approach represents an intrinsic analysis of the
data about political events, as opposed to an approach which
evaluates the data in relation to an outside criterion
(Lazarsfeld, 1954).

However, once underlying classes are

identified for each group, a further analysis is done to
relate the classes to background information about
respondents and to other attitudinal variables from the
"Images in Conflict" study.

The discriminant analysis is

used to examine the construct validity of the classes
identified using latent class analysis, in order to gain a
fuller understanding of the substantive meaning of the
particular pattern of thought represented in each of the
latent classes.
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Stage Three is divided into three parts, each one a
within-group analysis of one of the national samples using
latent class analysis.

For each national group: 1) The

responses are divided into dichotomous values of 'modal'
versus 'non-modal' responses to each of the questions about
the events; 2) The total number of possible combinations of
responses is evaluated in relation to the observed
distribution of patterns, to see if the distribution can be
said to represent two or more underlying classes, and if so,
what combinations of variables are most likely to represent
each of the classes; 3) Finally, if latent classes are
identified which explain the patterning of the data, the
respondents are assigned to classes on the basis of their
responses, and a discriminant analysis is carried out to
explore further how the underlying classes are
differentiated.

I. Palestinian Sample
165 cases are included in the latent class analysis.
These are the 'complete' cases out of 251 total cases in
which responses to all variables used in the latent class
analysis were available (i.e. not coded as "other" or
"missing").

However these cases include 49 individuals who

provided answers for all three of the events, but whose
response to 'results of the treaty' was coded originally as
"other" (49/251 - 19.5%).

For these cases an "other"
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response could be treated as equivalent to 'unclear' or
'bad' results of the treaty (based on a series of
comparisons of the means).
Four out of the six variables form the basis of the
analysis: cause of the Israeli raid on Beirut; cause of the
Palestinian attack on the bus; cause and result of the
Israeli-Egyptian treaty.

Modal and non-modal responses have

been identified for each of these questions.

The

distributions for the sample as a whole as compared to the
smaller set of 'perfect cases' are listed in Table 11.
Table 11
Palestinian Modal Answers for Variables included in the
Latent Class Analysis
Overall
Cause of Israeli raid
(0) retaliation, etc.
(1) blame
Cause of Palestinian attack
(0) resistance/terror
(1) retaliation
Cause of treaty
(0) betrayal/forced
(1) negotiation
Result of treaty
(0) good results
(1) unclear/bad results

n
(208)

•ComDlete Cases'
n-165
36%
64

38%
62
(211)
41%
59

38
62
(214)
48
52

49%
51
(230)
41%
59

42
58

Two variables are not included (results of raid and
results of bus attack) because they do not seem to add much
to the understanding of each of the events in this sample.
For instance, knowing how a person understands what led up
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to the Israeli raid on Beirut tells the story of how they
see the raid.

Whether a person sees the results in terms of

'more war' or 'people killed' does not seem to add to the
overall picture.

The same could be said for results of the

Palestinian attack on the bus.

Thus the latent class

analysis is based on four dichotomous variables, yielding a
total of 24 " 16 possible patterns of response.
The first step in latent class analysis is to determine
whether the variables are related at all.

In this case the

chi-square statistic (Pearson - 28.057, Likelihood ratio «
27.575 with 11 degrees of freedom) is significant,
indicating that there is a relationship among the variables.
Next, a two-class model (unrestricted) is tested.

This

model fits very well, indicated by the low significance
level of the likelihood ratio chi-square testing the
difference between the expected values of the two-class
model and the observed patterns in the data (likelihood
ratio chi-square - 6.723 with 6 degrees of freedom).

A

three class model was tested also, and although it fits, it
does not represent a statistically significant improvement
over the two-class model.

Moreover the two-class model is

more parsimonious, so that its results are described here.
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Table 12
Percentage of Palestinian Respondents with Modal Responses
to Events according to Latent Class
(0) - non-modal response
(1) - modal response
Class 1
Cause of Israeli Raid
(0) Aggression
(1) Retaliation

100%
0

Class 2
39%
61

Cause of Palestinian Attack
(0) Resistance
(1) Retaliation

58
42

25
75

Cause of Israeli-Egyptian Treaty
(0) Betrayal
(1) Negotiation, exchange

62
38

39
61

Result of Israeli-Egyptlan Treaty
(0) Good results
22
(1) Bad results
78

55
45

Latent Class Probabilities

.60

.40

likelihood ratio chi-square
6.72
percentage of cases correctly allocated

df - 6
82.12%

The two latent classes contain different 'readings' of
the three events.

The distribution of responses for class

one indicates that a person in this class would tend to say
that: Israeli desire to destroy Palestinians leads up to the
Israeli raid on Beirut; the Palestinian attack on the bus
comes about due to Palestinian resistance; the IsraeliEgyptian treaty is a form of betrayal (or comes about
because the parties were forced to join in); and the treaty
will have bad results —

increased tensions, etc.

This

pattern of response can be called the 'conflict maintenance'
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pattern, since the interpretation of the three political
events is consistent in terms of maintaining or escalating
hostilities between the various involved parties.

People

with this outlook see Palestinian national aspirations as
facing a hostile environment, in which Israel is a main
actor, and see the Egyptian-Israeli treaty as a bad omen for
the Palestinian cause.

The conflict maintenance class

(outlook) comprises 40% of the sample.
Palestinians in class two tend to feel that: the
Israeli raid is a form of Israeli retaliation for prior
attacks; the Palestinian attack on the bus is a form of
retaliation or response to prior Israeli policies/attacks;
the Israeli-Egyptian treaty came about due to negotiations
(Egypt, Sadat), and will have positive results (chance of
peace).

This pattern can be termed 'reactive* in that each

action is interpreted according to an outlook where actions
are responded to 'in kind'.

In comparison to the conflict

maintenance outlook, the reactive outlook does not include
as hostile an image of the environment.

Israel is not seen

as malevolent, but as facing its own problems (i.e. attacks)
and the peace treaty is seen as a sign that change in the
environment is possible, even if it involves only Egypt and
Israel.

This outlook is held by 60% of the sample.

The statistical program, MLLSA (Clogg, 1977), reported
that 82% of the cases are correctly allocated to the
classes, indicating a high degree of confidence in
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differentiating the classes.

Since the latent class

analysis succeeded in separating the data into different
classes, a further analysis was warranted to examine the
differences between the conflict maintenance class and the
reactive class in terms of variables which were not included
in designating the classes, but which were expected to
correlate with the latent classes.

This is a test of

construct validity, as well as a means of fleshing out more
fully the substantive meaning of the two classes.
Several substantive working hypotheses were spelled out
regarding the factors that were expected to distinguish the
two patterns of thinking identified in the Palestinian
sample.

People in the the conflict maintenance class were

expected to be more pessimistic than people in the reactive
class regarding the likelihood of peaceful relations in the
region.

Since the reactive pattern seems to contain a less

hostile image of Israel than the conflict maintenance
pattern, people in this group were expected to be more open
to 'compromise' solutions regarding Israeli-Palestinian
relations.

People in the reactive class were expected to be

older, more traditional, and less politicized than people in
the conflict maintenance class, and, consequently, they were
expected to identify with the term 'Palestinian' to a lesser
degree than people in the conflict maintenance class.
A discriminant analysis was carried out to see the
extent to which differences in background and attitude
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characterize the two classes.

Discriminant analysis is a

multivariate statistical method for distinguishing between
two or more groups, in this case the two underlying classes
(conflict maintenance and reactive), identified using latent
class analysis.

Based on the predictor variables included

in the analysis, the technigue forms one or more linear
functions which express in a single index the maximum
separation between groups (Klecka, 1975).

The results are

displayed in Table 13:
Table 13
Discriminant Function Analysis on Latent Classes:
Palestinian Sample (n-143)
Groups: Conflict Maintenance (0)
Reactive
(1)
Wilks'
Lambda
Variable
.927
+ optimism about peace
+ views on Palestinian autonomy on W.B. .933
+ importance of foreign influence
.948
+ extent, of Israeli-Arab identity
.956
+ importance of God's will, justice
.963
+ Moslem religious identity
.970
.974
- education
+ importance of strength
.974
+ extent of Israeli identity
.988
+ Arab unity, justice, leadership
.989
+ Pal. state within '67 or '47 borders
.992
+ Arab territories
.993
.994
+ Jewish territories
+ age
.995
.996
+ Israeli-Palestinian coexistence
.996
religion
+ willingness for intergroup contact
.998
urban/rural residence
.999
.999
sex
- extent of Palestinian/Arab identity
.999
after discriminant function:
canonical correlation: .47

F
11.03
10.05
7.64
6.49
5.28
4.30
3.82
3.78
1.78
1.60
1.13
1.01
.84
.73
.65
.52
.35
.21
.73
.00

Wilks' lambda: .78
chi-square -32.36,
significance - .04

sian
.001
.002
.007
.01
.02
.04
.052
.054
.18
.21
.29
.32
.36
.40
.43
.47
.56
.65
.87
.97

df - 20
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Before the discriminant function is formed, the
predictors are described in univariate terms according to
two measures shown in Table 13: 1) Wilks' lambda indicates
the relative strength of each variable in discriminating
between the groups:
discriminating power.

the lower the lambda, the more
2) For each predictor variable the F

statistic compares the mean scores of each of the latent
classes.

Once the discriminant analysis has been completed,

the discriminatory power of the predictor variables taken
together as a set is indicated by the canonical correlation,
which is a measure of the discriminant function's ability to
distinguish between the groups.

The square of this

correlation is the proportion of variance in the
discriminant function explained by the groups.

(In the two-

group situation the canonical correlation is equal to the
Pearson correlation coefficient between the discriminant
score and the binary group variable.)

Finally, Table 13

shows Wilks'' lambda for the discriminant function
(indicating the proportion of the total variance in
discriminant scores explained by differences among the
groups), as well as its associated chi-square test of
significance which tests the null hypothesis that group
means on the discriminant scores are equal.
Table 13 indicates that the two latent classes are
associated with other attitudinal and demographic measures.
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In univariate terms at least six predictor variables
differentiate between the two classes, as indicated by the
lower lambdas and the higher F ratios.
Of the demographic variables included in the analysis
only schooling is reasonably effective (but not
statistically significant) in differentiating between the
two latent classes: People in the conflict maintenance class
are likely to be better educated than people in the reactive
class.

Although the age does not differ significantly

between the two groups, there is a slight tendency for
people in the conflict maintenance class to be younger than
the people in the reactive class.

Neither religion (Moslem

- Christian), rural-urban differences nor sex differentiate
between the two groups.
The remainder of the predictor variables included in
this analysis were attitudinal measures which summarize five
major sections of the "Images in Conflict" study.

These

sections included: 1) attitudes towards nine different
proposals regarding the future of the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip; 2) perceptions about the importance of 14 different
elements in determining the outcome in the Middle East
conflict; 3) perception of the nature of relations (hostilepeaceful) between Israelis, Egyptians and Palestinians in
the past, present and future; 4) extent of political
identification measured by assessing the acceptability to
the respondent of different 'labels' (e. g. Palestinian,
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Arab, Israeli-Arab, Israeli, Moslem, Christian, Druze); 5) A
social distance measure regarding the respondent's
willingness to interact with Israelis in various degrees of
social intimacy.

Each set of questions was summarized by

creating indices based on principal component analysis.
Fifteen indices which summarize these attitudinal measures
were included in the discriminant analysis.
The greatest discriminatory power of any of the
predictor variables is exhibited by an optimism-pessimism
index regarding the expectations about future Israeli,
Egyptian and Palestinian relations.

People in the reactive

class are likely to be more optimistic about the possibility
of peace than people in the conflict maintenance class.

It

is not surprising that this variable differentiates between
the two outlooks, since the results of the Israeli-Egyptian
treaty are coded in terms of good/optimistic or
bad/pessimistic results.
Another strong predictor variable taps a person's views
about Palestinian autonomy and/or a limited form of an
independent Palestinian state in the West Bank as acceptable
options regarding the future of the West Bank and Gaza:
people in the reactive class have more positive views about
this as an option than do people in the conflict maintenance
class, who oppose the more limited 'compromise' solution.
The role of foreign influence (U.S. power, world Jewry,
Russian influence, European influence and U.S. opinion) was
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seen as more important in affecting the outcome of the
Middle East conflict by people in the reactive class than
people in the conflict maintenance class.

This suggests

that people with the reactive outlook think that changes in
the conflict environment can originate in forces outside of
the region.
People in the reactive class are also more likely than
people in the conflict maintenance class to use the terms
'Israeli-Arab', ’Christian' or ’Druze* or 'Moslem' about
themselves.

Moslem religious identity also differentiates

between the two classes.

The factor measuring 'Palestinian'

and 'Arab' identity does not differentiate between the two
groups, although people in the conflict maintenance class
were expected to prefer these labels to a greater degree
than the people in the reactive class.

This suggests that

the reactive outlook is related to a political identity
which has more than one possibility:

it is not less

Palestinian, but more open to other group identifications.
Some might call this ambivalence; others might call it
cognitive complexity.

The emerging picture is that the

reactive class is more traditional, religious, and
politically conciliatory towards negotiations with Israel
than the conflict maintenance group.
The canonical correlation of .47 indicates that the
group variable (the two latent classes) accounts for 22% of
the variance in the multivariate discriminant function (i.e.
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of the full set of twenty predictor variables included in
the analysis).

The results of the discriminant function

analysis support the notion that there are two distinctive
outlooks among the sample of Palestinians in Israel.

II. Israeli sample
309 'complete cases' out of 555 cases are included in
the analysis of patterns across the three political events.
In this analysis, five out of the six variables are used:
cause and result of Israeli raid on Beirut; cause of
Palestinian attack on a bus; cause and result of IsraeliEgyptian treaty.

'Results of the bus attack' was excluded

since it does not appear to add to the meaning of the bus
attack.

The distribution of responses for each of the five

variables is displayed in Table 14.

The five dichotomous

variables yield a total of 25 - 32 possible response
patterns.
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Table 14
Israeli Modal Answers for Variables Included in the Latent
Class Analvsis
Overall
Cause of Israeli raid
(0) strategic
(1) retaliation
Result of Israeli raid
(0) more war/retaliation
(1) reduce conflict
Cause of Palestinian attack
(0) retaliation/strategic
(1) blame (terror)
Cause of treaty*
(0) Israeli contrib. etc.
(1) Egyptian desire/Sadat
Result of treaty
(0) unclear
(1) good

n
(469)
20%
80

'Complete cases'
n-309
20%
80

(452)
54%
46

54
46
(485)

19%
81

20
80
(497)

53%
47

51
49
(471)

45%
55

44
56

*Coding scheme #1 for treaty cause.

The chi-square test of Independence (Pearson

- 36.725;

likelihood ratio - 41.546 with 26 degrees of freedom)
Indicates that the variables are related.
A two-class model (unrestricted) Is tested first; this
model fits the data reasonably well (chi-square - 26.6 with
20 degrees of freedom, p«.l5).

A three-class model

(unrestricted) Is tested next, and represents a statistical
Improvement over the two-class model (chi-square - 14.87
with 14 degrees of freedom), as well as a substantive
improvement (since it differentiates into two separate
classes the large clump of responses (over 80%) identified
as a single class in the two-class model).
model is shown in Table 15.

The three class
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Table 15
Percentage of Israeli Respondents with Modal Responses to
Events according to Latent Class
(0) - non-modal response
(1) - modal response
Class 1

Class 2

Class 3

Cause of Israeli Raid
(0) Strategic
(1) Retaliation

50%
50

Result of Israeli Raid
(0) Retaliation, people die
(1) Reduce conflict

33
67

58
42

66
34

Cause of Palestinian Attack
(0) Retaliation, resistance
(1) Terror

17
83

25
75

8
92

Cause of Israeli-Egvotian Treatv
(0) Israeli Concessions
(1) Sadat, Egyptian desire

76
24

40
60

57
43

Result of Israeli-Egvotian Treatv
(0) Unclear, mixed results
(1) Good results

0
100

47
53

100
0

.62

.15
df-<14
83. 13%

latent class probabilities
.23
likelihood ratio chi-square
14.87
percentage of cases correctly allocated

0%
100

58%
42

The first point to be noted about this model is that
the bus attack does not differentiate between the three
classes.

The latent class analysis did not unmix those

Israelis who view the attack as a form of terrorism (81%)
from those who did not explain the attack in terms of
terrorism (19%), indicating that there is a shared
interpretation about the attack on the bus: it is a
terrorist action.

Israeli consensus about this is very high
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across all of the classes.
Class one could be termed the 'efficacy' outlook, in
that the pattern of answers reveals a sensibility where
Israel is seen as an active agent able to affect and change
its environment. The first variable, cause of the Israeli
raid on Beirut, indicates that people in class one are as
likely as not to offer a retaliation explanation for the
raid.

However, whatever they say about the cause of the

raid (whether in terms of retaliation or strategic
considerations), they view the raid as resulting in reduced
conflict or fewer attacks.
terrorism.

The bus attack is seen as due to

The treaty is seen as arising from Israeli

concessions and exchanges, and is seen overwhelmingly as
having positive results.

In other words, when Israel acts,

either to defend itself or to procure a treaty, it is
effective in moving in its desired direction.

The efficacy

pattern comprises 23% of the sample.
Class two, the largest class of the three identified
among Israelis (62%),
Israeli raid.

'loads' most strongly on cause of the

The raid is seen as a form of retaliation for

prior attacks, but in contrast to the efficacy outlook, the
raid is not expected to reduce conflict.
seen as a terrorist action.

The bus attack is

The treaty is seen as arising

due to Sadat's initiative and/or Egyptian impetus, and the
expectations about results of the treaty are not clearly
differentiated for this class.

These responses are
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stimulus-related:

'When they are bad, we will hurt them, and

when they're good, we'll see'.

The philosophy Implicit in

this outlook is that 'Israel exists within a volatile
environment; when the environment is hostile, respond in
kind, when the environment is conciliatory, respond in kind.
This class could be termed the 'reactive' pattern.
Class three, accounting for the smallest percentage of
the responses (15%), could be called the 'hostile
environment' pattern.

These people view the Israeli raid in

political-strategic terms of security, as a pre-emptive
strike, where Beirut is seen as a PLO stronghold.

However,

they do not see the raid as being effective in reducing
conflict; on the contrary, they see more war, Palestinian
retaliation, people killed, etc.

The Palestinian attack on

the bus is nearly unanimously viewed as a terrorist action.
The Israeli-Egyptian treaty is seen in terms of Israeli
concessions and exchanges, but the treaty is expected to
have unclear, possibly negative results.

The sense here is

that no matter what Israel does, whether to attack, to
protect itself, to negotiate and give up things for the sake
of a treaty, nothing good (peaceful) will come of it.
hostile environment is seen as unchanging.

The

People with this

outlook could be expected to be more pessimistic about the
possibility of peace in the Middle East than the people with
efficacy or reactive outlooks.
Israelis in the three classes identified using latent
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class analysis were expected to be differentiated on several
points.

The efficacy outlook contains an image of Israel

that is self-sufficient, whereas the hostile environment
class contains an image of Israel under siege.
Consequently, people in the efficacy class were expected to
place less weight on the importance of foreign influence in
determining the outcome of the Middle East conflict compared
to people in the hostile environment class.

In addition, it

was expected that people in the efficacy class would prefer
to retain or annex the West Bank and Gaza Strip as part of
Israel and would tend to reject 'compromise' solutions
regarding the territories.

The hostile environment class

was expected to be the most pessimistic and despairing about
future Israel-Arab relations.
A discriminant analysis was carried out to explore
further the differences among the three classes.
results are shown in Table 16.

The

Table 16
Discriminant Function Analysis on Latent Classes: Israeli
SAJBBl* (n-286)
Wilks"
Variable
Lambda
pessimism re: peaceful Is-Eg relations .966
extent of Israeli identity
.969
acceptability of Palestinian state
.978
.983
importance of foreign influence
optimism re: Israeli-Palestinian rlns .983
willingness for contact w/ Palestinians1.983
sex
.989
willingness for contact w/ Egyptians
.990
ashkenazi/sephardi background
.990
.992
religiosity
importance of justice/faith
.992
.992
acceptability of annexation of W.B.
view of Palestinian-Egyptian relations .993
school
.994
optimism re: future I-E relations
.994
.997
age
.998
ethnic-Jewish identification
importance of strength
.998
after discriminant function:
canonical
correlation
function #1:
.37
function #2:
.28

F
4.93
4.50
3.18
2.67
2.49
2.48
1.58
1.48
1.46
1.18
1.10
1.05
1.01
.90
.75
.48
.27
.26

sian
.008
.01
.04
.07
.09
.09
.21
.23
.23
.31
.34
.35
.36
.41
.47
.62
.76
.77

Wilks'• chi-sq sig.
lambda
<3f
.79
63.82 36 .003
17 .15
.92
22.9

Only three of the predictor variables differentiate
between the three latent classes to a significant degree at
the univariate level.

The first, which measures the extent

of pessimistic expectations about the future of IsraeliEgyptian relations, differs significantly across the three
latent classes:

The efficacy class is the least pessimistic

(x - 1.9, s.d. « .98); the modal class slightly more (x *
2.3, s.d. - 1.05) and the hostile-environment class is the
most pessimistic of the three (x - 2.6, s.d. - 1.15).
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The second predictor variable which differentiates
between the groups measures the extent of Israeli identity.
(Respondents in the Israeli sample were asked to indicate
how much they identified with various groups: Israelis,
Israeli Jews, Jews, Ashkenazim, Sephardim.)

People in the

reactive class identify more consistently with this term (x
~ .77, s.d. - .42) than do people in the other two classes
(efficacy x “ .60, s.d. - .49; hostile environment x “ .60,
s.d. - .50).
The third predictor variable with any univariate
discriminatory power involves the acceptability of a
Palestinian accommodation of some sort on the West Bank and
Gaza Strip.

The efficacy class is the least open to this

notion (x - .68, s.d. * 1.0), the hostile environment class
is slightly more open to this notion (x - .88, s.d. « 1*2),
and the reactive class is the most open to this (x - 1.11,
s.d. - 1.2).

This predictor variable is one of several used

to summarize a set of questions about the future of IsraeliPalestinian relations on the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Of

the nine options regarding the future of Israeli-Palestinian
relations and the status of the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip, none were clearly acceptable to the Israeli
population in general (On a 5-point scale where 1 unacceptable and 5 * acceptable, no proposal had a mean
reaching 3.0 in this sample.).

None of the remaining

predictor variables separated the three classes
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significantly at the univariate level, including the
demographic variables.
The discriminant function analysis results in two
functions, shown in Table 16.

The first has a canonical

correlation of .37, where the division into the three
classes accounts for 14% of the variance among the predictor
variables taken as a set.

The second function, with a

canonical correlation of .28, has a lambda of .92 (chisquare « 22.9 with df - 17) indicates that the amount of
discriminating information of the remaining variables is not
statistically significant for differentiating between the
groups.

In other words, the three classes could be ordered

linearly in terms of a single discriminant function, and
using an

additional dimension in the form of a second

function does not add to the separation of the three groups.

III.

The Egyptian sample

178 out of 530 cases are included in the latent class
analysis of the Egyptian data.

These represent the

'complete' cases in which coded responses are available for
each of the three political events.
Four variables are included in the analysis: cause of
the Israeli raid, cause of the Palestinian attack, and cause
and result of the Israeli-Egyptian treaty.

The four

dichotomous variables yield a total of 24 « 16 possible
response patterns.

The modal answers for the entire sample
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are shown In the column headed

"Overall" in Table 17; the

modal answers for the subset of 178 cases included in this
analysis are shown in the column headed "Analysis #1".
Table 17
Modal Responses for Egyptian 'Complete Cases*

overall
Raid Cause
retaliation/etc.
blame
"other"
"missing"
Bus Cause
resistance/etc.
29.5%
retaliation
"other"
"missing"
Treaty Cause
pragmatic/land
Egypt/Sadat
"other"
Treaty Result
unclear/bad*
good results

n
(274)
43%
57

Anal Y9Iff fl
(n-178)

Analysis #2
(n-497)
23%
31
24

47%
53

22

(319)
53%
47

50%
50

36
13
21.5

32%
68

30%
50
20

14%
86

24%
76

(407)
38%
62
(445)
15%
85

"For Analysis #2 this category includes responses originally
coded as "other" (56/530-10.6%).

The chi-square of independence for this sample is very
low (likelihood ratio - 10.541, Pearson - 10.40, with 11
degrees of freedom), indicating that there is no association
or relationship among the four variables.

Thus only one

class is necessary to account for this pattern, and no
further latent class analysis would be fruitful.

(A two-

class model was tested, but it did not represent a
statistical improvement over the model of independence.)
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Given the pattern of "missing" answers described in
Stage One of this study (see Table 2), in which there is a
tendency for Egyptians to respond to questions about the
Israeli-Egyptian treaty, but have missing responses to
questions about the Israeli raid and the Palestinian attack,
it is possible that a significant body of opinion was left
out of the analysis above.

A parallel problem exists in

terms of answers coded as "other" for this sample (see Table
1).

For this reason a second latent class analysis is done

to include a broader range of cases from the Egyptian
sample.
The second set of latent class analyses uses 497 out
530 Egyptian cases.

These include people whose responses to

the Israeli raid and/or Palestinian attack were coded as
"other" or "missing" (The percentages for each event are
reported in Table 1 and Table 2.).

Four variables are used

in the analysis: cause of the Israeli raid on Beirut; cause
of the Palestinian attack on the bus; cause and result of
the Israeli-Egyptian treaty.

A total of 96 response

patterns are possible, based on two 4-level variables (raid
cause and bus cause), one 3-level variable (treaty cause)
and one dichotomous variable (treaty result).

Table 17

shows the distribution of responses in the column headed
"Analysis #2".
This time the chi-square test for independence is high
(likelihood ration chi-square - 331.52, Pearson chi-square =
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364.69, with 82 degrees of freedom), indicating that there
is a relationship among the variables.
A two-class model was tested first, but it did not fit.
Next, a three-class model (unrestricted) was tested, which
resulted in an excellent fit between the model and the
observed data (likelihood ration chi-square - 70.42 with 67
degrees of freedom).

A four-class model was also tested,

and although it fit, it did not represent a statistically
significant improvement over the 3-class model.

The results

of the three-class model are shown in Table 18.
Table 18
Responses of Egyptian Respondents to Events according to

Cans# pf Iffrati1 Raid
Retaliation/etc.
Aggression
"Other"
"Missing"

36%
40
17
8

4%
7
10
79

16%
36
49
0

Cause of Palestinian Attack
Resistance/etc.
Retaliation
"Other"
"Missing"

50%
44
5
0

7%
0
4
89

9%
50
35
6

Cause of Israeli-Egyptian Treatv
Pragmatic reasons/land
Egyptian desire/Sadat
"Other"

26%
68
6

37%
51
12

31%
13
56

Result of Israeli-Egyptian Treatv
Unclear/bad/"other"
Good results

22%
78

24%
76

28%
72

Latent Class Probabilities

51

likelihood ratio chi-square
70.42
percentage of cases correctly allocated

.22

.26
df-67
86.87%
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The latent class analysis results in three basic
response patterns for Egyptians: the modal response group;
the people who do not answer raid or bus cause (i.e.
"missing"); and the people who answer "other" on cause of
raid and cause of treaty.

These patterns corroborate what

seemed apparent from the initial examination of the Egyptian
data —

that there were three types of answers —

coded

substantively, coded as "other" and coded as "missing".

The

latent class analysis thus far reveals that these response
propensities hold across the variables taken as a set and
constitute distinct types of response.
Despite the existence of these distinct groups, the
latent class analysis points to a strong Egyptian consensus
about the of results of the treaty, which holds irrespective
of a person's latent class membership: about three quarters
of the sample is enthused about the chance of positive
results from an Israeli-Egyptian treaty, and one quarter of
the sample is more skeptical.
For class one the substantive meaning of the pattern of
response is clear.

For both the Israeli raid and

Palestinian attack the probabilities are nearly evenly
divided between viewing 'retaliation' and 'aggression' as
bringing about the Israeli raid, and between viewing
'resistance' and 'retaliation' as bringing about the
Palestinian bus attack.

The view of the Israeli-Egyptian
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treaty is more clearly defined: people see it as due to
Egyptian desire for peace and/or Sadat, rather than due to
pragmatic considerations, and most people expect positive
results from the treaty.

This class comprises 51% of the

sample, and can be termed the 'modal response'.
Latent class two is made up of those people who do not
provide an answer for either cause of the raid of cause of
the bus attack, but who do respond to the questions about
the Israeli-Egyptian treaty.

This class will be called the

'treaty only' class. People with responses falling into this
class rather than other classes are more likely than others
to attribute the cause of the treaty to things other than
Egypt/Sadat, although Egypt/Sadat remains the majority
response.

The treaty only pattern includes 22% of the

sample.
Latent class three is made up of people who view the
Israeli raid either in terms of Israeli aggression or as
"other", the Palestinian bus attack either as retaliation or
as "other", and the cause of the Israeli-Egyptian treaty
either as "other" or as due to pragmatic considerations and
concern about regaining the Sinai.

Given that the "other"

answers have a meaning that is not retrievable for the
purposes of the present analysis, the question is whether
the meaning of the responses in class three can be
approximated on the basis of the patterns across the
variables.

If the substantive responses which fall into
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this class can be taken as Indicative of the outlook of this
group, this class might be seen as more skeptical about
peace than the majority of the Egyptian sample.

This

pessimism seems to emerge even in the case of results of the
treaty, where this class appears to be more negative than
class one respondents about the consequences of the treaty.
This pattern can be termed the skeptical outlook, and it
includes 26% of the sample.
Background factors were expected to differentiate among
the three response patterns in the Egyptian sample.

The

treaty only group was expected to include younger women with
less education living in rural areas -- this group of people
was expected to be more politically naive or aware of
regional politics in the Middle East than other Egyptians.
People in the "other" class were expected to be better
educated, older, possibly part of the Egyptian opposition in
that they appear to be more skeptical about the peace treaty
than people in the other two classes.
A discriminant analysis using both background and
attitudinal variables was carried out next, to differentiate
between the people in the three latent classes.
are shown in Table 19.

The results

Table 19
Discriminant Function Analysis on Latent Classes: Egyptian
Sample (n-463)
Wilks'
Variable
Lambda
F
.925 18..47
sex
age
.944 13..68
optimism re: peaceful Is-Eg-Pal relations
.973 6..47
importance of strength
.979 4..98
urban/rural residence
.983 3..94
importance of leadership/Arab unity
.989 2..52
religion
.990 2..38
importance of russian influence, Jewry
.990 2..26
acceptability of Arab-Jewish state
.990 2..22
importance of justice, passage of time
.993 1,.41
acceptability of Palestinian state
.994 1,.38
.994
.35
school
view of past Is-Eg-Pal relations
.995
.04
.57
acceptability of Jewish state
.998
.53
religiosity
.999
willingness for task-related Is. contact
.38
.999
expectations re: future Is-Eg relations
.29
.999
willingness for intimate contact w/ Is.
.26
.999
importance of Western influence
.11
.999
1 ,

1 ,

i

<

<

after discriminant function:
canonical
correlation
function #1:
.37
function #2:
.27

sign
.00
.00
.002
.007
.02
.08
.09
.11
.11
.25
.25
.26
.35
.57
.59
.69
.75
.77
.90

Wilks'
chi-sq sig
lambda
.80
100.30 38 .00
.93
34.01 18 .01

Of the demographic variables included in the analysis
sex, age, urban/rural differences and religious affiliation
each differentiate significantly between the three latent
classes.

Class one is 65% male, older (x* 33.1, s.d.*

11.7), 59% urban and 77% Moslem.

Class two is 58% female,

younger (x*26.0, s.d.* 10.3), more rural than the sample
overall (46% compared to 39%) and more often Coptic than
people in the other two classes.

Class three is 65% female,

124

older than

people in class two ( x-31.4, s.d.* 11.2),

mostly urban (73%) and Moslem (74%).
Of the attitudinal variables Included in the analysis,
two differentiate between the three classes at the
univariate level.

The group means on optimism about future

Israeli - Arab relations suggest that people in the treaty
only class tend to be more hopeful than people in the other
two class (and they may be more naive, too.).

The variable

measuring the role of strength (economic, military and
demographic) in determining the outcome of the Middle East
conflict is seen as more important by people in modal class
or in the skeptical class than by people in treaty only
class.
In multivariate terms two discriminant functions were
formed, both of which are useful in differentiating between
the three groups.

The first, with a canonical correlation

of .37, accounting for 14% of the variance, is highly
correlated with age (+), optimism (-) and religious
affiliation (moslem).

The second function, with a canonical

correlation of .27, accounting for 7% of the variance,
correlates highly with sex (female), urban/rural differences
(rural), role of leadership (important), and role of
strength (important).
The discriminant analysis indicates that background
variables (socio-cultural differences between groups of
respondents) are significantly related to type of responses

12 5

given to the political events by Egyptians, suggesting
variations in the political culture of Egyptian society
(along the lines of traditional, non-politicized versus more
educated, male, politicized).

The pattern of

differentiation of attitudinal variables suggests that the
main difference is between people in treaty only class and
other Egyptians —
knowledgeable.

between the ignorant and the

Discussion and Conclusions

This study involves an examination of the responses,
explanations and interpretations offered by Israelis,
Palestinians and Egyptians to three political events related
to the Middle East conflict.

The discussion of the key

issues and findings of this study is divided into several
sections.

In the first part the major findings of this

study are reviewed, findings regarding differences in
outlook among the national groups, as well as variations
within each national group about the meaning of the
political events.

In addition, the stimulus set used in

this study is evaluated.

The second part focuses on the

utility of studying perceptions of political events as a
means of getting at: l) within-group variations in outlook
or 'worldview' or 'reality worlds;' and 2) the conflict
interaction system via common ways of looking at different
events at the between-group level.

Finally, the

implications of the study for conflict resolution theory and
practice are explored.

A.

Major Findings

The responses to the events often seemed truncated, or
at least so well understood that there was no need for the
respondent to spell out the meaning of the response to the
interviewer. Thus it became clear that the overall task in
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the data analysis was to reconstruct the meaning or to
excavate the underlying framework by which people in a
society make sense of the changing stream of events and
actions in the political environment.

The first step in the

'excavation' involved examining the differences in the views
of the three national groups.
The study shows that each national group has a
distinctive way of interpreting the 'same' event, to the
point that the single stimulus event must be thought of as
eliciting responses which reflect the particular concerns of
each national group.

However, within each national group

there are various types of thinking about the three events
taken as a set

—

and probably about conflict and peace in

general.
a.

Palestinian sample (living in Israel).

revealed two basic outlooks within this population:
conflict maintenance outlook:

The study
1) The

Israeli hostile action is

understood as an attempt to destroy Palestinians; the
Palestinian attack on an Israeli bus is seen as an action in
the name of Palestinian resistance; the Israeli-Egyptian
peace treaty is seen as a form of betrayal for which Sadat
is to blame, and the treaty is expected to bring increased
conflict and tensions.

Thus, change in the ongoing conflict

environment is seen as unlikely, and the 'peace treaty' is
understood as resulting in increased tensions.

At the heart

of this way of thinking lies an image of Palestinian
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Identity under siege, and as especially threatened by
Israel.

In this light the interpretation of the treaty as a

hostile event can be understood:

since the Egyptian/Sadat

treaty was not a help to the Palestinian cause, it is seen
as a hindrance.
2)

The reactive outlook: The Israeli raid on Beirut is

understood in terms of Israeli retaliation for prior
attacks, the Palestinian bus attack is seen as a retaliation
or response to Israeli policies or attacks; Egypt and/or
Sadat are credited for the treaty, which is expected to
bring positive results.

This group of people sees change in

the conflict environment as a possibility — war actions are
expected to result in more war, and a peace initiative is
expected to bring peaceful results —

although the locus of

change is the Other rather than the Self.

Israel is seen in

more conciliatory terms, and there is some optimism among
people with this outlook that peace between Israel and Egypt
does not negate Palestinian aspirations.

This group of

people has a stronger 'Israeli-Arab' identity compared to
the conflict maintenance group, although both groups
identify strongly (first and foremost) as "Palestinians" and
as "Arabs".

Finally, further evidence of a more

conciliatory stance towards Israel among this group of
people is seen in their readiness to accept Palestinian
autonomy on the West Bank and Gaza Strip as an acceptable
solution to the problem of Israeli-Palestinian relations.
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Background factors did not differentiate to a
statistically significant degree between these two groups of
people, although schooling and age were somewhat correlated
with latent class membership:

younger, better educated

people tend to have a conflict maintenance outlook, whereas
older, less well educated, more traditional people tend to
have a reactive outlook.

This pattern resembles studies of

American Blacks and extent of radicalism (cf. Marx, 1967) .
Similarly, Tajfel (Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel and Turner, 1979)
has remarked upon the changing social identity of dominated
groups.

The findings of the present study lend support

Smooha's (1984) typology of political identity of Arabs
living in Israel (based on data collected in 1976).

He

identified three basic orientations among Arabs in Israel:
accommodating, reserved and dissident.

The conflict

maintenance group resembles the Smooha's dissidents, and the
reactive group seems to combine the accommodating and the
reserved orientations.

b.

Israeli (Jewish) sample.

Three basic patterns of

thinking emerged regarding the political events.
efficacy outlook

The

contains an image of Israel as successful

in influencing the environment in the direction desired to
achieve Israel's aims.

Thus the Israeli raid on Beirut is

seen as effective in reducing conflict.

Similarly the

treaty is brought about through Israeli concessions and
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exchanges In order to achieve good results —

namely, peace.

This Is an Image of Israel in control of the environment and
of the conflict, rather than an image of Israel at the mercy
of the Other.

This is apparently a super-hawkish outlook,

in that among the three outlooks, people with the efficacy
pattern place the greatest emphasis on the importance of
tangible strength, and are the most in favor of options
regarding the West Bank which involve annexing the
territories and even expelling the Arab populations.

They

are the least open to 'compromise' solutions regarding the
West Bank.

They identify less strongly as 'Israeli'

compared to people in the reactive pattern (but they
identify to a degree comparable to the hostile environment
group).
In contrast, the reactive pattern is based on a notion
that 'what comes around, goes around,' wherein each event is
interpreted in terms of what provoked it.

The Israeli raid

is seen as a response to prior attacks, and is expected to
result in more attacks and retaliation by the other side.
By the same token the treaty is perceived as a positive
overture by Sadat and as evidence of Egypt's desire for
peace, and it is expected to have positive results.

People

with this pattern are more open to changes in the political
environment than the other two groups, but they see change
as originating in other actors, rather than being initiated
by Israel.
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The third class, the hostile environment outlook, is
particularly concerned with Israel's survival in the face of
a hostile world.

These people see the raid on Beirut as

strategically motivated as an attempt to rout out
terrorists, but consider it ultimately ineffective in
reducing conflict.

Rather, in the long run the conflict is

expected to persist and to remain unresolved.

The bus

attack is seen almost unanimously in terms of Palestinian
terrorism and hatred of Jews, more so than by the other two
classes.

The treaty is seen as coming about due to Israeli

concessions, but its results are seen as unclear or
negative.

Thus, Israel is felt to be at the mercy of a

hostile political environment, which Israel can do nothing
to change.

More than the other two groups, this group of

people places more emphasis on the importance of outside
(foreign) influence in determining the outcome of the Middle
East conflict, a feeling which goes along with the analysis
that without outside help, Israel can do little on its own
to survive.
Demographic factors did not differentiate among persons
with the three outlooks identified among Israeli
respondents.

This finding is to be contrasted with the

general point made by a group of political scientists about
Israeli society, namely, that there appears to be an
overwhelming consensus in Israeli society about national
security, irrespective of 'social location'

(cf. Arian,
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Herman and Talmud, in press). The present study suggests
that although Israelis may agree that terrorism against
Israelis is a horrible thing, there is variation at the
cognitive level regarding issues such as how Israel ought to
handle terrorist actions or what 'peace' means.

These

cognitive differences did not have demographic correlates in
this study, but the differences exist, despite consensus on
certain specific points.

c.

The Egyptian sample is essentially unified in

outlook about the events, despite the existence of different
styles of response that are demographically correlated.

No

clear consensus emerges about the meaning of either the
Israeli raid or the Palestinian bus attack, whereas Egyptian
views about the treaty and Egypt's leadership role in it are
very clear.

The treaty itself has taken on nearly symbolic

meaning for Egyptians.

The people who offer coded responses

to the events tend to view the treaty in terms of idealistic
peace —

Sadat and the Egyptian people initiated peace

because they desired it, because they felt that negotiations
were important.

People whose responses to the hostile

events had been coded as "other" had a more skeptical view
of what peace brings than other Egyptians.

People who "had

not heard" of the two hostile events tended to view the
treaty idealistically, although more of them viewed the
treaty in pragmatic terms than did people in the modal
group.
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Egyptians view the others, Israelis and Palestinians,
as the cause of the conflict.

Either they ignore the others

and their hostile actions (i.e. which resulted in missing
responses to the questions about the Israeli raid on Beirut
and the Palestinian attack on the bus in Israel) and attend
only to the one event that involves their society in a
central way, or they blame both Palestinians and Israelis
(in fact they blame Israel a little more) and they see Egypt
as stepping into the fray to make peace.
d.

Methodologically. latent class analysis used in

this study proved to be an advance in terms of how to handle
problematic data.

The Egyptian sample in particular

appeared problematic at the outset of this study because not
only was around one quarter of the sample's responses coded
as "missing" for two out of the three stimulus events, but
in addition nearly one quarter of the sample had responses
that had been coded as "other" for these events.

Analysis

of the remaining cases resulted in a set of responses which
did not differentiate the population (and it was only
178/530 cases), so that it appeared that the sampling in
Egypt had not been done well and had not succeeded in
reaching a range of people within Egyptian society.
The use of latent class analysis to analyze for
patterns of response using the full set of cases made it
possible to retrieve the meaning of these types of response
to the political events.

It showed the systematic nature of
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the missing data.

From these patterns it became clear that

in fact the sampling had been done quite well in terms of
reaching various segments of the population, but that the
response tendencies for some of these segments tended to
differ.

Young, often Coptic women with less schooling who

live in rural areas responded to the hostile events with "I
haven't heard about this" or "I don't know",

whereas well

educated, urban, Moslem women responded to these events in
terms that were not captured by the clearly inadequate
coding scheme used to code the data.

(In contrast an

adequate scheme would have been sufficient to capture these
responses.)

Zeisel (1947/1985) has discussed the handling

of different types of 'missing' data (See also Davies and
Jacobs (1968)).
In contrast, demographic factors were not especially
helpful in differentiating between the various patterns of
thinking in the Palestinian and Israeli cases.

Latent class

analysis identified various patterns of thought in the
Israeli and Palestinian samples which cut across demographic
factors.

However in the Egyptian case the demographic

factors were essential and highly correlated with response
type.

To explain the difference in the role of background

variables in the three samples one can refer to several
types of similarities between the Israeli and Palestinian
samples which distinguish them from the Egyptian case.

At

the level of sampling there could have been a difference.
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But all three samples are quota samples, based on the
attribute space described In the methods section of this
study.
More likely is a difference in the nature of the
societies and their respective political cultures.

It

should be noted that the Palestinians in Israel and Israeli
Jews were drawn from among people living within Israel, so
that at least in purely geographic terms these people share
the same space, and probably they are informed by many of
the same or similar media communications.

(This is an

argument about similar contexts for the Israeli Jews and
this group of Palestinians).

A still more effective

argument is that Israeli and Palestinian societies (wherever
they are sampled in the world) are more politically engaged
and concerned about the Arab-Israeli conflict, because it
involves them more centrally than it affects the Egyptians.
Thus the patterns of thinking about political issues cut
across demographic factors, more or less in both of these
populations.

This pattern of Israeli and Palestinian

engagement and Egyptian distance seems to be true for other
Israeli, Palestinian and Egyptian samples from the Images
study (sampled in the USA, for instance.)
As represented in this sample, Egyptian society appears
to be of a different sort —

more stratified, with more

layers of difference based on social location than is the
case for either Israeli Jews or Palestinians living in

136

Israel.

There seems to be a traditional sector and a more

developed sector, a difference which Is related to age, sex,
education and urban/rural differences.

Irrespective of

sector, the treaty and Egypt's Initiating role have
penetrated into all strata of Egyptian society.

2.

War and peace actions

The structure of aggregate-level responses for the
three events taken as a set suggests that there are
distinctive ways of perceiving or explaining war (Israel1Palestinian) actions which differ from perceptions or
explanations regarding treaty-related (Israeli-Egyptian)
actions.

This was indicated in two ways:

first, the types

of interpretation offered for hostile actions differed from
the interpretations about the peace treaty.

Second, the

pattern of similarities and differences in outlook among the
three national groups was constant for the two hostile
events but changed in relation to the peace treaty.
The type of explanation offered for the cause of a
hostile action has to do with the relationship between the
interpreter's nationality and the national actor's 'role' in
the stimulus action.

The aggressor justifies the action,

whereas the victim blames the aggressor.

The hostile

actions elicit conflict-related interpretations from each
party: We are victims; they are aggressors.

The two hostile

actions, the Israeli raid on Beirut and the Palestinian
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attack on a bus in Israel, result in mirror images, and thus
can be considered as functionally equivalent actions, in
that they generate comparable types of explanation.
Egyptian/Palestinian ('Arab') versus Israeli differences
predominated for the hostile Israeli-Palestinian actions.
What Arabs blamed, Israelis justified and what Israelis
blamed, Arabs justified.

Egyptian-Palestinian differences

in interpretation of the hostile interactions were minuscule
compared to the Arab-Israeli differences.
The peace treaty resulted in different types of
explanation as well as in an altered pattern of Arab-Israel
differences (mirror images) and Egyptian-Palestinian
similarities in interpretation.

The sorts of explanations

offered for cause and results of the Israeli-Egyptian peace
treaty were different enough from the explanation about the
hostile actions to warrant a separate coding scheme.

The

treaty elicited a set of concerns different from the ones
elicited by war actions: what peace 'costs,' what is to be
gained, what is not being addressed by a treaty.

The

structure of explanation was different, although because
there was only one peace action it is difficult to determine
what the explanations would have looked like if Israel had
initiated a peace action.

However, a subgroup of

Palestinians viewed this event as a hostile action, for
which they blamed Sadat.

Consensus about the meaning of the

treaty was high among Egyptians, the initiators of the
action, but lower among Israelis and Palestinians.
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Consensus within each national group shifted in
relation to the different stimuli.

For Israelis and

Palestinians, events where a group sees itself as victimized
(Israeli raid for Palestinians and Palestinian attack for
Israelis) resulted in more extreme responses (blame) and
greater consensus than other events.

For Egyptians this was

true about the treaty, regarding which Egypt sees itself as
the central actor, the initiator of positive change.
These areas of consensus can be taken as evidence of
'negative' and 'positive national identity'

(S. P. Cohen,

personal communication, Autumn, 1982), where negative
identity emphasizes aspects of the nation's history which
are seen as part of an ongoing experience of victimization
(exile, diaspora, suffering and destruction).

In contrast,

positive national identity is a national self-image which
emerges out of the pursuit of the nation's ideals and goals
for national development.

In the present study the hostile

actions elicited explanations involving negative national
identity, whereas for Egyptians the peace treaty elicited
aspects of positive national identity.
The calculus or logic of war is different from that of
peace.

In the hostile actions the Other is blamed for

instigating an action or forcing the Self to defend itself
or assert its existence.

The environment is seen as

changing for the worse, because of the Other.

To deal with

this hostile environment, each side must assert itself and
its needs.
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One factor

which differentiates war from a period of

transition towards peace is that the goals and motivations
in wartime are clearer than they are in changing from war to
peace.

In all-out war, the presumption is that 'they are

out to get us'.
more suspect:

In transition time, the motivations become
'they may be trying to trick us . '

'they are sincere,'

Even if

'they are only a minority and the

majority will topple their decision'. Each optimistic, hopebased idea is subject to the 'reality principle' of
skepticism and mistrust.

3. Evaluation of the stimulus set
a.

It is unfortunate that the order of the three

events in the stimulus set was not varied within each of the
populations.

The fact that the three events in this study

were presented to respondents in only one order probably
underscored the Egyptian and Palestinian tendency to see a
sequence as 'first Israelis raid, then Palestinians
retaliate'.
b.

Various types of responses were elicited by the

different stimulus events: hostile interactions resulted in
'self-as-victim', whereas the treaty shifted the focus to
'what is gained or lost' in the name of peace.
Unfortunately the range of stimuli was rather limited; only
one peace-related action was used, and it involved Israel
and Egypt only (whereas the hostile actions involved Israel
and Palestinians only).
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The stimulus set did not include an Israeli-Palestinian
cooperative action, or, an Egyptian-Israeli conflict action.
Thus it is hard to tell whether the 'peace treaty' aspect of
the third stimulus, as distinct from the Israeli-Egyptian
nationality (alliance) aspect of the action (or from some
interaction of these elements) distinguishes the third
stimulus from the first two.

These dimensions are

confounded in the stimulus set as given.
This

particular set of stimuli managed to tap only so

much of the outlook of each group.

This limitation might

explain, for instance, the absence of the leftists/peace
niks from the patterns uncovered in the Israeli sample.
They do not emerge particularly in the latent class
analysis, because the areas of contention on which they
would be expected to differ the most from their compatriots
are not tapped by the three stimulus events.

If additional

stimuli had been used (such as "Israeli professors and
students demonstrate on the West Bank in support of
reopening the Palestinian Bir Zeit University, closed by
Israeli authorities"), perhaps a wider range of sentiments
would have been expressed.
As consideration of the stimuli used in this study
indicates, it is difficult to apply an experimental, systembased framework to an historically grounded phenomenon.
Parsons (1965) has commented, this sort of study has an
"irreducible historical element" that controlled

As
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experimental studies do not have.

"In other words, the kind

of asymmetry that I suggested has been operating in the
organization of living systems generally involving the
irreversibility factor, applies here at the methodological
level" (p. 65).

The point is that with historically-based

data, as opposed to theoretically-derived data, there are
necessarily empty cells in the stimulus set (i.e. this was
not a fully crossed design).

The three of the stimulus

events used in this study were historically factual —
had actually happened.

they

It would be interesting to speculate

about how the use of counter-factual events would be
received by respondents.

For instance, how would Arabs

react if Israel made a peace overture?

This question is

relevant for the design of a study and more important in
historical terms.

A large number of missing answers would

be expected, because many people would probably reject this
concept out of hand.

Such an inquiry would be a way of

using socio-psychological data to 'try out* the reactions of
the populations at large to new types of political actions.
This would be an advance over the types of laboratory
simulations that political scientists often have tried (c.f.
Guetzkow (1959) for instance).

14 2

B.

Utility of looking at interpretations of political

events
The comparison of the explanations given by people in
three societies about various political events seems
interesting in the first place because it is one 'window*
into the deeper set of beliefs which people/societies use to
make sense of the world they inhabit.

Certainly this is

related to the core belief ideas of Leites and A. George,
and 0. Holsti, as well as to operational code approach used
to understand key decision-maker's choices and policy
decisions.

The difference in this study is partly one of

scope: rather than examining the belief system of an
important individual political actor or at the views of
elites and influentials in the involved societies (cf.
Heradstveit, 1979), this study analyzed the outlooks among
the general populations of three societies involved in the
conflict.

Thus the content of people's understanding of the

political world is in itself a worthy object of study, since
there are no prior public opinion studies about Arab and
Israeli attitudes .
The present research presents a snapshot of people's
outlooks at a single moment in time.

In a study like this

one, which was undertaken in order to examine some processes
involved in a transition from war to peace in the Middle
East, the type of explanation became the object of interest,
once the content of the explanation was understood.

It was
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hoped that the types of explanations about the various
political events offered by people In the three national
groups would serve as an Index about the cognitive changes
Involved In moving from war to peace.

The change In

attributions or cognitions were difficult to examine with
the present data-set, which is cross-sectional, but not
longitudinal.
A preferable means of studying a transition from war
to peace is to use a longitudinal design:

to tap the

responses of people in different societies to various
changes in their world at various points in time.

In this

way the real world would be treated as a sort of giant
laboratory and the political events occurring in it would be
used as stimuli for a large-scale unplanned experiment.
Cantril (1958) did use this rationale in 1956 for looking at
how people viewed the Hungarian Uprising, which happen to
occur while he was studying the "protest voters" in several
European societies.

This approach would be a more powerful

'manipulation' than a laboratory experiment with people in
different 'conditions' which would be used to approximate
the real world (or to distill the essence of a real world
situation in a laboratory situation), because the people
come from the experience under scrutiny.

However, the real-

world approach is also more 'messy', as the problems pointed
out regarding the present study show.
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Geertz (1973), in his essay "Thick Description", talks
about the 'natural experiment' as one of the (unfortunate)
ways that ethnographers attempt to link the particular
research they do to the general world at large.

He argues

that the rationale of the natural experiment is problematic,
because although there is certain to be variation in the
world's cultural forms, "the context in which it occurs
varies with it.." (p. 22-23).

This criticism could be

leveled at the type of research described here.

However,

regarding the cross-national study of attitudes and
explanations about political events, the basic justification
for comparing the responses of people in different societies
is based on the fact that the comparison itself is not a
hypothetical one originating in the mind of the researcher.
Rather, it emerges directly from the existence of ongoing
conflict between nations or societies, and lies at the heart
of conflict resolution.

It relates to the question of how

adversaries, who start at such diametrically opposed and
competing positions, can come to coexist in an environment,
with a lower level of violence and hopefully ultimately in
peace.

The interaction system created by the conflict is

the object of study.
Alker (1968) has noted regarding cross-national studies
of modernization and development that there is a need to
improve how longitudinal inferences are made from crosssectional results.

Several types of inferences are sought
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based on the data about political events.

First, the study

has shown that the response patterns are different in the
three national groups (1. e. same stimulus produces
different effects within each of the groups.). Second, the
hostile events are comparable, in that they produce
symmetric patterns of response among the three groups (i. e.
similar stimuli result in comparable patterns of response
among three different groups, suggesting that they are
actors in the same interaction system.).

Finally, the peace

treaty differs from the hostile actions in that it changes
the pattern of response among the actors in the system.

It

should be clear, also, that the cross-national data are used
AS iX the three national groups were interrelating within an
interaction field that is really impossible to capture.
Campbell (1958) wrote an article called "Common fate,
similarity and other indices of the status of aggregates of
persons as social entities," which deals with the issue of
when it is reasonable to treat an aggregate as an entity in
terms of objective and subjective validity.

This conception

seems relevant to the approach taken in this study, namely,
that it makes sense to look at the parties to an
international conflict as part of the same system, in
relation to a common social structure.
Built into the set of inferences made in this study is
the moving back and forth between levels of analysis within
the conflict interaction system.

The study began with an
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analysis of the meaning of three events within each national
group.

Then an analytic scheme was devised for coding

events across the three national groups.

Next, the changing

pattern of 'relations' among the three national groups was
examined in terms of the similarities and differences in
response (in the frequency distributions) to the stimulus
events.

Finally the data were examined for the existence of

within group variations, rather than allowing the analysis
to 'rest' merely at the point of uncovering between-group
differences, which were to be expected in the first place.

C.

Once these different ways of understanding events in

conflict and peace are identified, how useful is this for
conflict resolution?
The attribution scenario of actor and observer
explaining to the 'same' stimulus action has been treated
like a microcosm for understanding the basic sociopsychological dynamics of international conflict.

Whatever

the shortcomings of using such an analogy, the essential
point remains, that there are different ways of interpreting
an action, depending on the interpreter's relationship to
the action: actor, victim/recipient, interested other,
bystander.
The language of perception has been used in discussing
this study.

Perception involves aspects of the field that

the perceiver must perceive in addition to characteristics
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of the perceiver's own internal make-up —

underlying

concerns, or a basic template for looking at certain types
of events.

Attribution theory makes this a social process,

in the sense that social position in relation to the action
becomes a variable, too.
The analysis of attributions between enemies reveals
the parallel structure, the mirror images offered by people
affiliated with the various parties in a conflict.

The

analysis is helpful because it lays out the differences in
perception between the adversaries.

However, the existence

of symmetric, mirror accounts of the 'same types of actions'
does not mean that there is also a rationality assumption
thrown in, too (i.e. "in your shoes I'd do the same thing").
A. Rapoport's (I960) distinction between opponents in a game
and adversaries in a fight is apropos.

In a game, while

there may be irreconcilable differences between the parties,
the opponent is essential to the game, and one prefers a
worthy opponent to a weak one.

The behavior of both parties

is determined by the same rules; the outcome is a function
of interdependent moves.

In a fight the adversary is

someone to be removed from the field or destroyed.

Thus,

although to an outsider the symmetric aspects of the
preferred modes of reasoning in conflict may be apparent
(and quite elegant), each of the adversaries is faced with
or engulfed by more essential concerns:

survival, security,

recognition, rather than a neat exercise in symmetry.
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The original stance taken at the start of this study
was to link people's interpretations of political events to
the framework used by researchers in causal attribution —
actor-observer differences in explanations of the 'same'
action.

At the end of this study it seems clear that a more

appropriate context for considering the cross-national
interpretations of political events is a widened, more
macro-level socio-cultural perspective, rather than a purely
cognitive social psychological perspective.
It is not sufficient for the purposes of conflict
resolution to show that adversaries offer divergent accounts
of the 'same' thing.

Such an analysis does not deal with

the meaning and substance of the attribution, which are
essential to know in trying to solve a conflict.
In conflict resolution some attention has been given to
explaining one's own side and one's view of the adversary.
The present study Bhowed the built-in tendencies for seeing
one's own side as victim in hostile interactions, but also
for focusing on one's own party's interests and needs in
relation to a peace action.

Including the treaty

stimulus event is important as a first

as an

step in learningmore

about the gray areas of attribution in times of transition
from war to peace.

A broader range of

events may

range of images of the nation which are possible.

expandthe
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The Implication of the present study Is that more types
of events are needed In the interaction system which can
shake up the closed perceptual system created by ongoing
hostile events.

Social psychologists have tended to ask,

'how can perceptions be changed?,' implying that the way to
resolve conflicts is to deal with the perceptions that seem
to perpetuate hostilities, and to try to change them by
addressing perceptions directly via cognitive techniques:
teaching people about their different perceptions, talking
about them and so on.
The perspective taken in this study is that the way to
change perceptions is to change the stimuli —

events —

which are the material to be perceived, in order to provide
opportunities for different types of perceptions.

In this

light the effectiveness of the problem solving conflict
resolution workshop (Kelman, Cohen) can be explained:

it

becomes an event by being a live instance of communication
across groups which succeeds in being credible for the
Israeli and Palestinian participants, more important than
any sort of substantive outcome that might emerge from the
workshop.
Attention needs to be given to designing peaceful
actions which can be perceived as peaceful by the involved
parties.

From the present research it was clear that such

actions need to be directed at all of the particular groups.
For instance, even though the Egyptian-Israeli treaty was
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Intended as a peace action (intended by Egypt, perceived
that way by Israelis; also, it was intended to be the one in
the stimulus set that was about peace), the peace treaty was
perceived by many Palestinians as a hostile action because
it did not deal with Palestinians and it was not directed
toward them.

To assess change in a social system a particular
attribute, like social structure, needs to be examined
before and after change has occurred.

In this vein it is

useful to conceptualize social structure as a cluster of
traits., and 'traits' as abstractions from the contentions
among groups of people within a system of society:
"..Social structures are defined by a set of issues
which comprise the characteristic areas of contention
among the constituent groups of a society.
If we then
say that one social structure has ceased to exist and
another has taken its place, we mean that the terms of
reference have changed by which the issues are defined,
relationships maintained or contentions resolved."
(Bendix, 1968, p. 72)
About the case at hand we can say that the issues
defined by the parties are the same, so that in a conflict
like the one in the Middle East, which has gone on for
decades/generations (i.e. 'protracted') the parties have
become part of the an 'emergent' social structure, based on
their ongoing [hostile] interaction.

Changing the conflict,

resolving it, involves fundamental changes within and
between the parties: the development of a new language as a
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cause and consequence of new deeds, new framework for making
sense of the world.

APPENDIX A
PRECODING SCHEMES

APPENDIX A
Precodes for Events Questions

RAIDl:
"The Israeli Air Force conducts a raid on Beirut.
What would bring about this event?"
01 - Retaliation for Palestinian attack or
military activities
02 - Retaliation for PLO attack or military
activities
03 - Retaliation for terrorist attack or military
activities
04 “ Israeli aggression, against
Arabs/Palestinians (i.e. desire to attack,
kill, etc.)
05 ■ War, hatred
06 - Pre-emptive strike, to prevent attack
07 - Political move
08 - No reason, nothing
09 - Beirut is a PLO stronghold/ (attempt to
weaken or destroy PLO)
10 - Israelis are terrorists
11 “ Palestinians are terrorists
12 " U.S. support of Israel
13 - Israeli expansionism
14 - Status quo, the situation
15 * Israel's justification for its security
16 - PLO - Israeli conflict over southern Lebanon
17 - Attempt to destroy or exterminate
Palestinians
18 ■ Israeli economic or internal problems
19 - Retaliation for Lebanon attack
88 ■ Other
99 ■ No answer/refused to answer/'do n 't know'
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Precodes for Events Questions
RAID2: "Israeli Air Force conducts a raid on Beirut.
What would be its results?"
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10

■
“
■

11 ■
12 14
15
16
17
18

“
-

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

■
■
■

28 ■
88 99 -

People killed,death, destruction (general)
Innocent people killed, hurt
Retaliation (unspecified)
Retaliation by Palestinians
Retaliation by PLO
More war, conflict, hostility, anger, hatred
Revenge by both sides
Terrorists killed, hurt
Reduce conflict, reduce terrorist attacks
World opinion — negative towards Israel
(against Israel)
World opinion — positive towards Israel (in
favor of)
Too much media attention (no right to so much
coverage)
Nothing, no result
U.N. response
Unity of Arab countries against Israel
U.S.A. reaction
More unrest and demonstrations (in the West
Bank and Gaza)
Lebanon's response to the PLO
Lebanon's response to Israel
Israeli victory
PLO strengthened
PLO weakened or destroyed
End of peace with Egypt
Negative impact on peace/autonomy talks
Annexation of Lebanese territory
Palestinian will or determination is
strengthened
Positive effect on peace talks (i.e. no more
PLO influence)
Other
No answer/refused to answer/'do n 't know'
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Precodes for Events Questions
BUSl: "Palestinians attack a bus on the Haifa-Tel Aviv
Highway. What would bring about this event?"
01 - Retaliation for Israeli attacks
02 - Response to Israeli policies
03 - Palestinian resistance, struggle against
Israel
04 - Terrorist activities
05 - Desire for world attention — no right to
attention
06 - Desire for world attention for their cause
07 - War, hatred
08 ■ Hatred of Jews, desire to hurt Israelis
09 - No reason, nothing
10 - Personality characteristics of Palestinians;
that's the way they are
11 - Attempt or desire to interrupt "normal" life
in Israel
12 - World attention
13 - Attempt or desire to make demands heard;
(e.g. release of prisoners)
14 - Policy of PLO
15 - Attempt or desire to regain Palestinian
homeland
16 - Attempt or desire to terrorize civilians,
murder women and children
17 - Afraid or unable to attack the army
88 - Other
99 « No answer/refused to answer/'don't know1
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Precodes for Events Questions
BUSl: "Palestinians attack a bus on the Haifa-Tel Aviv
Highway. What would be its results?"
01
02
03
04
05

«■
-

06
07
08
09

-

10 “
11 12 13
14
15
16
17

«

18 19 20 88 99 -

People killed,death, destruction (general)
Innocent people killed, hurt
Terrorists killed, hurt
Retaliation by Israelis
Retaliation by Israelis (large-scale
military assault)
Retaliation by Israelis in the West Bank
More war, conflict, hostility, anger, hatred
World opinion (negative) against Palestinians
World opinion (positive) in favor of
Palestinians
Achieve the objective of stating their cause
Reduce conflict
Force Israel to recognize Palestinian rights
to land
Media attention (negative coverage)
Media attention (positive coverage)
World attention
Increase Israel's military
Security tightened in Israel (administrative
and political)
Nothing
Expel Jews from Palestinian land/get rid of
Jews
Affects peace talks negatively
Other
No answer/refused to answer/'don't know'
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Precodes for Events Questions
TREATY1: "A peace treaty is announced between Israel
and Egypt. What would bring about this event?"
01 - Desire for a better economy
02 - Negotiations, discussions, peace talks
03 - Egypt's desire for peace, acknowledged it
can't win the war, tired of fighting
04 - Extra-regional involvement, U.S., U.N.,
U.S.S.R. pressure, influence or intervention
05 - Sadat
06 “ Sadat's treason
07 ■ Sadat the visionary
08 - Begin
09 - USA
10 - No reason, nothing will bring it about, can't
happen
11 ■ Arab recognition of Israel
12 - Recognition of Palestinian homeland
13 - Recognition of Palestinian autonomy and
rights
14 “ Desire to isolate Egypt from Arabs, divide
Arab countries
15 “ Israel's desire for peace, acknowledged it
can't win the war, tired of fighting
16 - U.S., Sadat, Begin
17 « Egypt's desire to regain land (Sinai)
20 - Mutual (Egypt and Israel) desire, compromise,
concessions
21 « Economic and social pressure within Egypt
22 “ Leadership change
24 - Sadat's/Egypt's desire for U.S.
support/al1iance
25 - October (1973) War
26 ■ Sadat's (personal) self-interest
27 - Sadat's/Egypt's/general deception
28 - Israeli concessions (one-sided, heavy)
88 - Other
99 * No answer/refused to answer/'don't know'
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Precodes for Events Questions
TREATY1: "A peace treaty Is announced between Israel
and Egypt. What would be its results?"
01 ■ Better economy
02 " Increased chance for peace In the Middle
East; more peaceful world; it would stop the
killing
03 - Loss of Arab support for Egypt, Egyptian
isolation
04 - No results, nothing would happen, no
difference
05 ■ Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai
07 - Sinai transferred, loss ofSinai
08 - Loss of Sinai and the security it provided
09 - Increase in the conflict
10 - Reexamination of Arab countries' stand
towards Israel
11 - Continuation of occupation and conflict
12 “ Lessening of tensions
13 “ Sadat's assassination
14 ■ Normalization of relations
15 " Bad for Israel
16 - Bad for Palestinians
17 - Bad for Egypt or Egyptians
18 - Bilateral peace Egypt/Israel only: end war
Egypt/Israel only
19 - Short-term peace (general)
20 - Increased power for Israel; increased attacks
on other Arab states; Israel free to do as
she pleases
21 - U.S. interests served
88 - Other
99 « No answer/refused to answer/'do n 't know'

APPENDIX B
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Israeli Quota Sample:
Cause of Israeli Raid on Beirut
70.8%
retaliation for terrorist attack (3)
9.4
Beirut is PLO stronghold (9)
5.8
retaliation for PLO attack (2)
3.6
retaliation for Palestinian attack (1)
2.6
pre-emptive strike (6)
1.9
Israeli security (15)
1.7
political motive (7)
1.1
Israeli aggression against Arabs (4)
0.9
PIA-lsrael conflict over south Lebanon (16)
0.6
war, hatred (5)
0.4
Israeli expansionism (13)
0.4
destroy or eliminate Palestinians (17)
0.2
Israelis are terrorists (10)
0.2
Palestinians are terrorists (11)
0.2
No reason, nothing (8)
0.2
status quo, the situation (14)
100.0 t (N-469)
[Codes not used: U.S. support for Israel (12); Israeli
economic or internal problems (18); retaliation for Lebanon
attack (19).]
Result of Israeli Raid on Beirut
reduce conflict (9)
PLO weakened (23)
(negative world opinion [12.4] (10)
(UN response [1.5] (15)
(too much media [0.7] (12)
12.6
more conflict (6)
8.6
terrorists killed (8)
9.1
(people killed [7.3%] (1)
(innocent people killed [1.8%] (2)
4.4
(retaliation [2.2%] (3)
(retaliation by Palestinians [.7%] (4)
(retaliation by PLO [1.5%] (5)
2.7
nothing (14)
0.7
revenge by both (7)
0.7
positive world opinion (11)
0.4
Israeli victory (21)
0.4
Palestinian will strengthened (27)
0.2
Arab unity against Israel (16)
0.2
US reaction (17)
0.2
unrest on West Bank (18)
0.2
Lebanon's reaction to PLO (19)
0.2
Lebanon's reaction to Israel (20)
0.2
PLO strengthened (22)
99.9 % (N-452)
[Codes not used: end peace treaty (24) ; negative impact on
peace (25); annex Lebanese territory (26); positive impact
on peace (28).]
29.9%
14.6
14.6
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Palestinian Quota Sample:
Cause of Israeli Raid on Beirut
25.5%
Israeli aggression vs. Arabs (4)
23.6
destroy or eliminate Palestinians (17)
17.3
retaliation for Palestinian attack (1)
8.7
Israeli expansionism (13)
4.3
retaliation for PLO attack (2)
4.3
Beirut is PLO stronghold (9)
4.3
Israelis are terrorists (10)
2.9
war, hatred (5)
2.4
political motive (7)
1.4
pre-emptive strike (6)
1.0
retaliation for terrorist attack (3)
1.0
retaliation for Lebanon attack (19)
1.0
Israeli security (15)
1.0
Israeli economic or internal problems (18)
0.5
US support for Israel (12)
0.5
status quo (14)
0.5_____PLO-Israel conflict over south Lebanon (16)
100.2 %
(N-208)
[Codes not used: Palestinians are terrorists (11), and
nothing, no reason (8).]
Result of Israeli Raid on Beirut
more conflict, war (6)
(people killed [22.7] (1)
(innocent people killed [4.8] (2)
(terrorists killed [1.9] (8)
8.6
(retaliation by Palestinians [4.3] (4)
(retaliation by PLO [2.4] (5)
(retaliation [1.9] (3)
3.9
negative world opinion (10)
1.9
UN response (15)
1.4
positive world opinion (11)
1.4
Palestinians strengthened (27)
1.4
Arab unity against Israel (16)
1.0
PLO weakened (23)
1.0
nothing (14)
0.5
reduce conflict (9)
0.5
revenge by both (7)
0.5
US reaction (17)
0.5
Lebanon's response to PLO (19)
0.5
Lebanon's response to Israel (20)
0.5
Israeli victory (21)
0.5
PLO strengthened (22)
0.5
end of peace treaty (24)
0.5
negative impact on peace (25)
0.5
annex Lebanese territory (26)
0.5
positive impact on peace (28)
99.9 % (N-207)
[Codes not used: too much media (12); more unrest and
demonstrations (West Bank/Gaza) (18); PLO strengthened (22)]
44.9%
29.4

162

Egyptian 1st Wave:
Cause of Israeli Raid on Beirut
28.8%
Israeli expansionism (13)
17.9
Israeli aggression against Arabs (4)
14.6
Beirut is a PLO stronghold (9)
13.4
(retaliation for Palestinian attack [8%] (1)
(retaliation PLO attack [2.9] (2)
(retaliation terrorist attack [1.8] (3)
(retaliation for Lebanon attack [.7] (19)
9.1
Israeli desire to destroy Palestinians (17)
4.0
war, hatred (5)
4.0
political motive (7)
2.2
PLO-Israeli conflict in south Lebanon (16)
1.8
pre-emptive strike (6)
1.5
Israel justification for security (15)
1.1
Israelis are terrorists (10)
0.7
no reason (8)
0.4
status quo (14)
0.4
Palestinians are terrorists (11)
99.9 % (N-274)
[Codes not used: Israeli economic or internal problems (18);
US support for Israel (12)]
43.3
30.4
6.9
3.8
3.1
1.9
1.9
1.6
1.3
1.3
0.9
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
100.0

Result of Israeli Raid on Beirut
more war (6)
(people killed [28.5] (1)
(innocent people killed [1.9] (2)
(retaliation [3.1] (3)
(retaliation by Palestinians [1.9] (4)
(retaliation by PLO [1.9] (5)
negative impact on peace (25)
annex Lebanese territory (26)
positive impact on peace (28)
nothing (14)
negative world opinion (10)
PLO weakened (23)
Lebanese response to Israel (20)
revenge by both (7)
unrest/demonstrations in West Bank (18)
Lebanese response to PLO (19)
PLO strengthened (22)
terrorists killed (8)
reduce conflict (9)
UN response (15)
Arab unity against Israel (16)
Israeli victory (21)
Palestinian will strengthened (27)
% (N-319)

[Codes not used: end peace treaty (21); US reaction (17);
too much media (12); positive world opinion (11)]
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Israeli Quota Sample:
Cause of Palestinian attack on Bus
37.3
22.4
8.6
4.5
4.5
4.1
4.1
3.7
3.2
2.6
1.3
1.1
1.1
1.1
0.4
100.0

terrorist activity (4)
hatred of Jews (8)
terrorize civilians (16)
war, hatred (7)
interrupt normal life in Israel (11)
Palestinian resistance (3)
Policy of PLO (14)
(desire for world attention [2.6] (6)
(desire world attention - no right [.9] (5)
(world attention [.2] (12)
retaliation for Israeli attacks (1)
Palestinian personality (10)
no reason (9)
response to Israeli policies (2)
make demands heard (13)
regain Palestinian homeland (14)
afraid to attack the army (17)
% (N-464)

Result of Palestinian Attack on Bus
22.9
21.0
16.3
13.2
13.0
5.6
2.3
1.4
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.4
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
99.9%

retaliation by Israel (large-scale) (5)
retaliation by Israel (4)
more war, conflict, hostility (7)
innocent people killed (2)
people killed (1)
Israeli security tightened (17)
negative world opinion (8)
nothing, no results (18)
achieve goals (10)
world attention (15)
terrorists killed (3)
reduce conflict (11)
affect peace negatively (20)
retaliation by Israel in West Bank (6)
positive world opinion (9)
force Israel to recognize Palest, rights 12)
negative media attention (13)
increase Israel's military (16)
(N-485)

[Codes not used: 'expel Jews from their land'
Palestinian media attention' (14).]

(19); 'pro-
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Palestinian Quota Sample:
Cause of Palestinian Attack on Bus
45.0
12.8
9.5
6.2
5.7
4.7
4.3
3.8
2.4
2.4
1.4
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
100.2 %

retaliation for Israeli attacks (l)
Palestinian resistance (3)
response to Israeli policies (2)
make demands heard (13)
desire for world attention (6)
war, hatred (7)
interrupt normal life in Israel (11)
regain Palestinian homeland (15)
hatred of Jews (8)
terrorist activity (4)
desire for world attention - no right (5)
terrorize civilians (16)
policy of PLO (14)
Palestinian personality (10)
world attention (12)
(N-211)

[Codes not used:
(17).]

'no reason'

(9); 'afraid to attack army'

Results of Palestinian Attack on Bus
37.9
10.4
10.4
10.0
7.1
4.7
4.3
3.3
1.9
1.9
1.4
1.4
0.9
0.9
0.9
0.9
0.5
0.5
0,5
99.8 %
[Code not used:

more war (7)
people killed (1)
retaliation by Israel (4)
retaliation by Israel - largescale (5)
force Israel to recognize Pal. rights (12)
innocent people killed (2)
achieve goals (10)
reduce conflict (11)
negative world opinion (8)
positive world opinion (9)
increase Israel's military (16)
affect peace negatively (20)
terrorists killed (3)
retaliation by Israel in West Bank (6)
world attention (15)
nothing, no result (8)
negative media attention (13)
positive media attention (14)
expel Jews from Palestinian land(19)
(N-211)
'Israeli security tightened'

(17).]

165

Egyptian 1st Wave:
Cause of Palestinian Attack on Bus
36.0
retaliation for Israeli attack (1)
28.2
Palestinian resistance (3)
9.6
response to Israeli policy
(2)
8.7
war, hatred (7)
5.4
hatred of Jews (8)
3.9
(desire for world attention [2.1]
(6)
(world attention [1.5] (12)
(desire world attention - no right [.3] (5)
3.0
attempt to regain Palestinianhomeland (15)
1.8
terrorist activity (4)
1.5
interrupt normal life in Israel (11)
0.6
Palestinian personality (10)
0.6
make demands heard
0.3
policy of PLO (14)
0.3
afraid to attack the Israeli army
(17)
99.9 % (N-333)
[Codes not used:
(16).]

'no reason*

(9); 'terrorize civilians'

Result of Palestinian Attack on Bus
35.8
24.3
22.4
6.2
2.8
2.5
1.2
1.2
0.9
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.3
0.3
99.7 %

more war (7)
(people killed [20.2] (1)
(innocent people killed [2.5] (2)
(terrorists killed [1.6] (3)
(retaliation (general) [15.6] (4)
(retaliation, large-scale [4.0] (5)
(retaliation on West Bank [2.8] (6)
affect peace talks negatively (20)
negative world opinion (8)
achieve their goals (10)
reduce conflict (11)
nothing, no result (8)
world attention (15)
force Israel recognize Pal. rights (12)
positive world attention (9)
Israel tightens its security (17)
expel Jews from Palestinian land (19)
positive media attention (14)
(N-321)

[Codes not used:

'negative media attention'

(13)]
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Israeli Quota Sample:
Cause of Israel1-Egyptian Peace Treaty
26.2
compromise, concessions (20)
24.7
Sadat (5)
14.7
Egyptian desire for peace (3)
8.0
Sadat the visionary (7)
4.0
Begin (8)
3.8
October 1973 War (25)
3.4
Egyptian desire to regain land (17)
3.0
Israeli desire for peace (15)
2.0
leadership change (22)
1.6
negotiations, discussions, peace talks (2)
1.6
economic/social pressure within Egypt (21)
1.4
desire for a better economy (1)
1.2
extra-regional involvement, pressure (4)
0.8
Sadat's treason (6)
0.8
Arab recognition of Israel (11)
0.8
US-Sadat-Begin (16)
0.6
Sadat's deception (27)
0.6
Israeli concessions (28)
0.4
USA (9)
0.2
no reason, can't happen (10)
99.8 % (N-497)
[Codes not used: 'recognition of Palestinian homeland' (12)
'desire to isolate Egypt' (14); 'Sadat's self-interest'
(26).]
Result of Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty
20.6
increased chance for peace (2)
17.4
bilateral Israeli-Egyptian peace (18)
15.7
normalization of relations (14)
14.0
lessening tensions (12)
6.6
Sinai transferred (7)
6.6
short term peace (19)
5.1
Israeli withdrawal from Sinai (5)
3.6
Better economy (1)
3.4
loss of Sinai security (9)
1.5
loss of Arab support for Egypt (3)
1.3
Bad for Israel (15)
1.1
no results, no change (4)
1.1
increased conflict (9)
0.6
re-examine Arab attitudes re:Israel (10)
0.4
increased Israeli power (20)
0.4
US interests served (21)
0.2
continued occupation and conflict (11)
0.2
bad for Palestinians (16)
0.2
bad for Egypt (17)
100.0 % (N-471)
[Codes not used: Sadat's assasination (13).]
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Palestinian Quota Sample:
Cause of Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty
21.0
Egyptian desire for peace (3)
17.3
Sadat (5)
14.5
Sadat's treason (6)
7.5
Egyptian desire to regain land (17)
7.5
economic/social pressure within Egypt (21)
5.1
desire for a better economy (1)
4.7
US pressure, outside involvement (4)
4.7
USA (9)
4.2
negotiations, discussions, peacetalks (2)
2.3
Sadat the visionary (7)
1.9
Israeli desire for peace (15)
1.4
October 1973 War (25)
1.4
Sadat's self-interest (26)
0.9
recognition of Palestinian homeland (12)
0.9
no reason, can't happen (10)
0.9
US-Sadat-Begin (16)
0.5
leadership change (22)
0.5
desire to isolate Egypt (14)
100.0 % (N-214)
[Codes not used: 'Begin' (8); 'Arab recognition of Israel'
(11); 'Sadat/Egyptian desire for US support or alliance'
(24); 'Sadat's deception' (27); 'Israeli concessions' (28).]
Results of Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty
27.6
increased chance of peace (2)
14.9
loss of Arab support for Eg. (3)
10.5
Israeli withdrawal from Sinai (5)
9.9
bilateral Israeli-Egyptian peace (18)
7.7
increased conflict (9)
6.1
normalization of relations (14)
5.5
better economy (1)
4.4
short-term peace (19)
2.8
increased power for Israel (20)
2.2
bad for Palestinians (16)
1.7
Sinai transferred (7)
1.7
continued occupation and conflict (11)
1.7
US interests served (21)
1.1
no results, no change (4)
1.1
reexamine Arabs' stand re:Israel (10)
0.6
Sadat's assasination (13)
0.6
bad for Egypt (17)
100.1 t (N-181)
[Codes not used:
'loss of Sinai security'
tensions' (12); 'bad for Israel' (15).]

(8); 'lessening
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Egyptian 1st Wave:
Cause of Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty
49.1
Egyptian desire for peace (3)
15.5
Egyptian desire to regain land (17)
11.5
Sadat (5)
6.6
desire for better economy (1)
3.9
negotiations, discussions, peace talks (2)
2.7
October 1973 War (25)
2.5
mutual compromise, concessions (20)
1.2
Sadat's treason (6)
1.2
USA (9)
1.0
Sadat the visionary (7)
1.0
extra-regional involvement - USA/UN/USSR (4)
0.7
US - Sadat - Begin (16)
0.7
Sadat's self-interest (26)
0.7
Israeli desire for peace (15)
0.5
Recognition of Palestinian rights (12)
0.2
Sadat's desire for US alliance (24)
0.2
Arab recognition of Israel (11)
0.2
Recognition of Palestinian autonomy (13)
Israeli concessions (28)
Qt2
99.6 % (N-407)
[Codes not used: 'Sadat's self-deception' (27); 'leadership
change' (22) ; 'economic and social pressure within Egypt'
(21); 'desire to isolate Egypt' (14); 'no reason, can't
happen' (10); Begin (8).]
Result of Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty
46.5
increased chance for peace (2)
17.1
Israeli withdrawal from Sinai (5)
15.1
better economy (l)
8.1
bilateral Israeli-Egyptian peace (18)
3.4
normalization of relations (14)
3.1
Egyptian isolation/loss Arab support (3)
1.6
lessening tensions (12)
1.6
Sinai transferred (7)
1.1
short-run peace (19)
0.7
no results (4)
0.7
increased conflict (9)
0.4
increased Israeli power (20)
0.2
Sadat's assassination (13)
0.2
Bad for Egypt (17)
Bad for Israel (15)
9,2
100.0 % (N-445)
[Codes not used: 'US interests served' (21); 'Bad for
Palestinians' (16); 'continued occupation and conflict'
(11); 're-examination of Arab attitudes towards Israel'
(12); 'loss of Sinai security' (8).]

APPENDIX C

Israeli raid: "What would bring about this event?"
EGYPTIANS
n = 274

PALESTINIANS
n = 208

ISRAELIS
n =469

17.3%
4.3
1.0
1.0

3.6%
5.8
70.8

Retaliation
1) ... for Palestinian attacks
2) ... for PLO attacks
3) ... for terrorist attacks
19) ... for Lebanon attacks

8.0%
2.9
1.8
.7
13.4%

23.6%

80.2%

Political-Strateqic (Beirut, security)
6) pre-emptive strike
1.8
7) political motive
4.0
9) Beirut is a PLO stronghold
14.6
12) US support of Israel
IB) Israeli security justification
1.5
18) Israeli economic or internal problems —

1.4
2.4
4.3
.5
1.0
1.0
21.9

2.6
1.7
9.4
1.9
10.6

15.6

Blame (Israeli aggression)
4)
10)
11)
13)
17)

Israeli aggression vs. Arabs
Israelis are terrorists
Palestinians are terrorists
Israeli expansionism
destroy or eliminate Palestinians

17.9
1.1
.4
28.8
9.1

25.5
4.3

1.1
.2
.2
.4
.4

8.7
23.6
57.3

62.0

2.3

Conf1ict-for-Granted
5) war, hatred
8) no reason, nothing
14) status quo
16) PLO-Israel conflict over south Leb.
TOTAL

4.0
.7
.4
2.2

2.9

.6
.2
.2
.9

.5
.5
7.3
99.9%

3.8
100.0%

1.9
100.0%

Palestinians attack: "What would bring about this event?"
EGYPTIANS
n = 3 33

PALESTINIANS
n =211

36.0%
9.6

45.0%
9.5

ISRAELIS
n= 464

Retaliation
1) retaliation for Israeli attacks
2) response to Israeli policies

45.6%
Political-Strategic (Palestinian resi stance)
3) Palestinian resistance
28.2
6) desire for world attention
2.1
12) world attention
1.5
13) to make demands heard
.6
15) to regain Palestinian homeland
3.0

54.5%
12.8
5.7
.5
6.2
3.8

35.4
Blame

3.2%
1.1
4.3%
4.1
2.6
.2
1.1
1.1
9.1

29.0

(terror, hatred of Jews)

4) terrorist activity
5) desire world attention - no right
8) hatred of Jews
10) personality characteristic of Pal
11) interrupt 'normal' life in Israel
14) policy of PLO
16) terrorize civilians, murder
17) afraid to attack the army

1.8
.3
5.4
.6
1.5
.3

2.4
1.4
2.4
.5
4.3
.5
.5

37.3
.9
22.4
2.6
4.5
4.1
8.6
.4

.3
10.2

12.0

80.8

Conf1ict-for-Granted
7) war, hatred
9) no reason, nothing

8.7
TOTAL

4.7
8.7
99.9%

4.5
1.3
4.7
100.2%

5.8
100.0%

Israeli raid:

—

ISRAELIS
n=452
2.2%
.7
1.5
.7
12.4
.7
1.5
.2
.2
.2
.2
.2
.4
21.1%
29.9
.7
.2
.4
14.6
—

—
45.8
7.3
1.8
8.6
17.7
12.6
2.7
—
1.3
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"What would be its results?"
EGYPTIANS
PALESTINIANS
Retaliation
n = 219
n =207
3) retaliation
3.1%
1.9%
4) retaliation by Palestinians
1.9
4.3
5) retaliation by PLO
1.9
2.4
7) revenge by both sides
.9
.5
10) world opinion negative against Isr . 1.6
3.9
-—
12) too much media (no right)
15) UN response
.3
1.9
16) unity of Arab countries vs Israel
.3
1.4
17) USA reaction
.5
.6
18) more unrest in West Bank and Gaza
.S
20) Lebanon's response to Israel
1.3
-22) PLO strengthened
.6
27) Palestinian will is strengthened
.3
1.4
12.8%
18.7%
Achieve Goals (reduce conflict)
9) reduce conflict, terrorist attacks
.3
.5
11) world opinion positive toward Israel —
1.4
19) Lebanon's response to PLO
.6
.5
21) Israeli victory
.3
.5
23) PLO weakened or destroyed
1.3
1.0
26) annexation of Lebanese territory
3.1
.5
28) positive effect on peace talks
1.9
.5
7.5
4.9
People Killed
1) people killed, death, destruction
22.7
28.5
2) innocent people killed, hurt
1.9
4.8
8) terrorists killed, hurt
1.9
.3
30.7
29.4
More War
6) more war, conflict
43.3
44.9
14) nothing, no result
1.9
1.0
24) end peace with Egypt
—
.5
25) negative impact on peace
3.8
.5
49.0
46.9
TOTAL
100.0%
99.9%

15.3
99.9%

Palestinian attack:

"What would be its results?"
EGYPTIANS
n = 321

Retaliation
4) retaliation by Israelis
15.6%
5) Israeli larqe-scale military assault 4.0
6) retaliation by Israel in West Bank
2.8
8) world opinion negative vs. Palest.
2.8
—
13) media coverage (negative)
—
16) increase Israel's military
17) Israeli security tightened
.6

PALESTINIANS
n = 211

ISRAELIS
n =485

10.4%
10.0
.9
1.9
.5
1.4
—

21.0%
22.9
.2
2.3
.2
.2
5.6

25.8%
Achieve Goals
9) world opinion favors Palestinians
.6
10) achieve objectives of stating cause
2.5
11) reduce conflict
1.2
12) force Israel to recognize Pal rights
.6
14) media attention (positive coverage)
.3
15) world attention
.9
19) expel Jews from Palestinian land
.3

25.1%
1.9
4.3
3.3
7.1
.5
.9
.5

6.4

52.4
.2
1.0
.4
.2
.8
—

18.5

2.6

People Killed
1) people killed, death, destruction
2) innocent people killed, hurt
3) terrorists killed, hurt

20.2
2.5
1.6

10.4
4.7
.9
24.3

13.0
13.2
.6
16.0

26.8

More War
7) more war, conflict
18) nothing, no result
20) affect peace talks negatively
TOTAL

35.8
1.2
6.2

37.9
.9
1.4
43.2
99.7%

16.3
1.4
.4
40.2
99.8%

18.1
99.9
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I

Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty : "what would bring about this event?"
EGYPTIANS
PALESTINIANS
ISRAELIS
n = 407
n =214
n = 497
Israeli Needs or Contribution
—
-8) Begin
4.0%
—
11) Arabs' recognition of Israel
.2%
.8
15) Israel's desire for peace, tired war
.7
1.9%
3.0
20) mutual desire, compromise
2.5
4.2
26.2
—
22) leadership
.5
2.0
28) Israeli concessions (one-sided)
—
.2
.6
3.6%
6.6%
36.6%
Palestinian Needs or Contribution
4) extra-regional involvement
1.0
4.7
1.2
6) Sadat's treason
1.2
14.5
.8
9) USA
4.7
1.2
.4
—
10) no reason, can't happen
.9
.2
—
12) recognition of Palestinian homeland
.5
.9
—
—
13) recognition of Palestinian rights
.2
—
-14) desire to isolate Egypt from Arabs
.5
.7
26) Sadat's self-interest
1.4
—
—
.6
27) Sadat's deception
4.8
3.2
27.6
Egyptian Contribution
3) Egypt's desire for peace, tired war 49.1
21.0
14.7
5) Sadat
11.5
24.7
17.3
7) Sadat, the visionary
1.0
2.3
8.0
61.6
40.6
47.4
Pragmatic Concerns
1) desire for better economy
6.6
5.1
1.4
2) negotiations
3.9
2.8
1.6
.7
16) USA, Sadat, Begin
.9
.8
17) Egyptian desire to regain land
15.5
7.5
3.4
21) economic and social pressure in Eg.
7.5
1.6
24) Sadat's/Egypt's desire US support
.2
25) October (1973) War
2.7
1.4
3.8
29.6
25.2
12.6
TOTAL
99.8%
99.6%
100.0%
•

—

•

•
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Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty: "what would
EGYPTIANS
n =407
Things to be Gained
1) desire for better economy
6, 6%
17) Egyptian desire to regain land
15. 5
24) Sadat's/Egypt's desire US support
.2
22.3%
Negotiation Framework
2) negotiations
3.9
3) Egypt's desire for peace, tired war 49.1
5) Sadat
11.5
7) Sadat, the visionary
1.0
8) Begin
9) USA
1.2
15) Israel's desire for peace, tired war
.7
16) USA, Sadat, Begin
.7
22) leadership
—

m g about this event?"
PALESTINIANS
ISRAELIS
n = 497
n =214
5.1%
7.5
12.6%
2.8
21.0
17.3
2.3
-4.7
1.9
.9
.5

59.2
.8
—

.9
4.2
—

26.2
.6
5.1

4.7
7.5
1.4
14.5
.9
.5
1.4
—

1.0
2.7
1.2
.7
—
5. 6
99, 6 %

27.6
1. 2
1.6
3.8
.8
.2
--.6

30.9
100.0%

8.2
99.8%
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TOTAL

1.6
14.7
24.7
8.0
4.0
.4
3.0
.8
2.0

__

.2
.5
.2
2.5
.2
3.6

extra-regional involvement
economic and social pressure in Eg.
October (1973) War
Sadat's treason
no reason, can't happen
desire to isolate Egypt from Arabs
Sadat's self-interest
Sadat's deception

4.8%

51.4

68.1

Exchange or Concessions for Peace
11) Arabs' recognition of Israel
12) recognition of Palestinian homeland
13) recognition of Palestinian rights
20) mutual desire, compromise
28) Israeli concessions (one-sided)

1.4%
3.4

Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty: "what would be its results?"
EGYPTIANS
PALESTINIANS
ISRAELIS
n=445
n=181
n=471
Chance of Peace
2) increased chance of peace
10) Arabs' reexamine stance re: Israel
12) lessening of tensions
14) normalization of relations
18) bilateral peace Egypt-Israel only
19) short-term peace

46.5%

27.6%
1.1

1.6
3.4
8.1
1.1

6.1
9.9
4.4
60.7%

Sinai
5) Israeli withdrawal from Sinai
7) Sinai transferred, loss of Sinai
8) loss of Sinai, security it provided

17.1
1.6
—

49.1%
10.5
1.7
—

18.7
Increased Tension
3) loss of Arab support for Egypt
3.1
4) no results, nothing
.7
9) increase in the conflict
.7
11) continuation of occupation, conflict
13) Sadat's assassination
.2
15) bad for Israel
.2
-16) bad for Palestinians
17) bad for Egypt
.2
21) US interests served
20) increased power for Israel
.4

TOTAL

5.1
6.6
3.4

14.9
1.1
7.7
1.7
.6
—
2.2
.6
1.7
2.8

15.1

15.1
1.5
1.1
1.1
.2
-1.3
.2
.2
.4
.4

33.3
5.5
100.1%

«

6.4
3.6

5.5
15.1
100.0%

74.9%

12.2

5.5
Economy
1) better economy

20.6%
.6
14.0
15.7
17.4
6.6

.
3.6
100.0%

i

Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty: "what would be its results?"
EGYPTIANS
PALESTINIANS
ISRAELIS
n =445
n = 4 71n = 181
Good Results
1) better economy
2) increased chance of peace
10) Arabs' reexamine stance re: Israel
12) lessening of tensions
14) normalization of relations
5) Israeli withdrawal from Sinai
7) Sinai transferred, loss of Sinai

15.1%
46.5
—
1.6
3.4
17.1
1.6

5.5%
27.6
1.1
—
6.1
10.5
1.7
85.3%

3.6%
20.6
.6
14.0
15.7
* **
***
52.5%

54.5

Unclear or Mixed Results
4) no results, nothing
5) Israeli withdrawal from Sinai
7) Sinai transferred, loss of Sinai
18) bilateral peace Egypt-Israel only
19) short-term peace
21) US interests served

.7
** *
* **
8.1
1.1
—

1.1
** *
***
9.9
4.4
1.7

1.1
5.1
6.6
17.4
6.6
.4
17.1

9.9

37.2

Bad Results
3) loss of Arab support for Egypt
8) loss of Sinai, security it provided
9) increase in the conflict
11) continuation of occupation, conflict
13) Sadat's assassination
15) bad for Israel
16) bad for Palestinians
17) bad for Egypt
20) increased power for Israel

14.9
—
7.7
1.7
.6
-2.2
.6
2.8
4.8
100.0%

1.5
3.4
1.1
.2
-1.3
.2
.2
.4
30.5
100.1%

8.3
100.0

177

TOTAL

3.1
—
.7
-.2
.2
—
.2
.4
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